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Abstract 
 
During the first half of the sixteenth century attempts were made by Europeans to colonise 
Venezuela and Canada, as the rush for land in the New World increased at pace. Yet these 
colonial attempts have largely been forgotten by history despite the legacies they left both 
for Europe and the American continent itself. There are two reasons why these ventures 
have been overlooked. Firstly, they were non-Iberian. Secondly, they both failed. The efforts 
of the Welser merchant-banking company to colonise Venezuela (1528-1556) and the 
French Crown to settle Canada (1541-1543) have been subordinated in the historical 
literature to the successful colonisation carried out by the Spanish and the Portuguese in the 
New World, which began at the end of the fifteenth century, and led to imperial empires. 
Indeed, the phenomenon of colonial failure as a whole has remained relatively unpopular 
amongst academics. Whilst some more “popular” failed colonies have been studied 
individually, there has been no comparative approach to determine the shared causes for 
failure amongst a number of unsuccessful enterprises during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. This work shall look to produce such a comparative, using the Welser and French 
colonies as case studies, given their underrepresentation in the literature. It shall use the 
few available primary sources, as well as foreign-language studies, to give a detailed 
understanding of the factors that caused the colonies to fail. A lack of preparedness, a lust 
for riches amongst the colonists, and poor foreign relations shall be identified as the three 
main causes for failure, each of which could be applied to a greater or lesser extent to other 
failed colonies. These attempts at colonisation shaped the early settlement patterns in the 
New World, impacted upon the social and political structures of the native populace and led 
to considerable alteration of the natural environment. It is important that we increase our 
understanding of them.  
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Introduction 
In the 1530s and 1540s the Germans and the French, eager to reap some of the benefits of 
New World expansion which they perceived in the Portuguese and Spanish empires, established 
colonies in Venezuela and Canada respectively. The German colony was governed by representatives 
of the Welser merchant-banking house of Augsburg and lasted from 1528 to 1556; the French 
enterprise in Canada, building on earlier explorations in the region by Jacques Cartier, received the 
royal patronage of King Francois I, and existed between 1541 and 1543. Unlike the Spanish and 
Portuguese, who had a general paradigm of successful settlement in the New World, the Welser and 
French colonies failed to prosper. Historians have given great attention to the first Iberian colonies in 
the New World, given the empires that resulted from them and the obvious impacts they had on the 
American continent. Fewer scholarly works, however, have been specifically concerned with the 
phenomenon of colonial failure, which in some cases had a comparable legacy to the more 
successful ventures.  
The most significant failed colonies during the sixteenth century were all non-Iberian 
enterprises. Some of these efforts, such as the French attempts to establish colonies in Brazil in the 
1550s and Florida in the 1560s, have been well-studied on an individual level.1 The “lost colony” of 
Roanoke, founded by the English in Virginia in 1585, has also been thoroughly examined by 
contemporary historians.2 Other attempts, such as those examined here, have been largely 
                                                          
1
 For the Brazil colony see: F. Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World (Boston, 1865); P. Gaffarel, 
Histoire du Brésil Français au Seizième Siècle (Paris, 1878); T.E. Smith, ‘Villegaignon: Founder and Destroyer of 
the First Huguenot Settlement in the New World’, Papers of the American Society of Church History, Volume 3 
(1891) pp. 185-206; C.E. Nowell, ‘The French in Sixteenth-Century Brazil’, The Americas (1949) pp. 381-393; J. 
Whatley, ‘Food and the Limits of Civility: the Testimony of Jean de Lery’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, Volume 
15(4) (1984) pp. 387-400; J. Whatley, ‘Impression and Initiation: Jean de Lery’s Brazil Voyage’, Modern 
Language Studies, Volume 19(3) (1989) pp. 15-25;  F. Lestringant & A. Blair, ‘Geneva and America in the 
Renaissance: the dream of a Huguenot refuge 1555-1600’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, Volume 26(2) (1995) 
pp. 285-295; J.T. McGrath, ‘Polemic and History in French Brazil, 1555-1560’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, 
Volume 27(2) (1996) pp. 385-397; F. Lestringant, Le Huguenot et le Sauvage: L’Amérique et la Controverse 
Coloniale, en France, au Temps des Guerres de Religion (Paris, 1999); J. Eriksson, ‘Travelling Savage Spaces : 
Jean de Lery and Territorialisations of “Antarctic France”, Brazil 1555-1560’ in K.G. Hammarlund (ed.), Borders 
as Experience (Halmstad, 2009) pp. 68-91. 
For the Florida colonies see: H.P. Biggar, ‘Jean Ribault’s Discovery of Terra Florida’, The English Historical 
Review, Volume 32 (1917) pp. 253-270; M.A.F. Gorman, ‘Jean Ribault’s Colonies in Florida’, The Florida  
Historical Quarterly, Volume 44(1/2) pp. 51-66; C.E. Bennett, Fort Caroline and its Leader (Gainesville, 1976); L. 
Fishman, ‘Old World Images Encounter New World Reality: Rene Laudonniere and the Timucuans of Florida’, 
The Sixteenth Century Journal, Volume 26(3) (1995) pp. 547-559; J.T. McGrath, The French in Early Florida: in 
the eye of the hurricane (Gainesville, 2000); C.E. Bennett, Laudonniere & Fort Caroline: history and documents 
(Tuscaloosa, 2001); F.A. Mann, Florida Historical Tales: Story of the Huguenots; a Sixteenth Century Narrative 
(Charleston, 2008). 
2
 For example see: C.W. Porter, Adventurers to a New World: the Roanoke Colony, 1585-87 (Washington, D.C., 
1972); D. Stick, Roanoke Island: the beginnings of English America (Chapel Hill; London, 1983); K. O. 
Kupperman, Roanoke, the abandoned colony (Totowa, N.J., 1984); I. Noel Hume, The Virginia Adventure: 
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neglected by English-language academics. Moreover, no work has offered a comparative approach 
to investigate common causes for colonial failure. 
This thesis shall look to take such a comparative approach by studying the Welser and 
French colonies, which whilst disparate in structure and location, offer similar explanations as to 
why they failed. Despite a dearth of literature on the two colonies, there is enough evidence to 
establish three overriding causes for failure, which could be applied to other New World colonies 
that did not survive: firstly, the lack of preparedness of the enterprises in regards to their 
geographical knowledge, provisioning and leadership; secondly, the lust for riches of the colonial 
leaders and settlers, in which speculative exploration was privileged over sustainable development; 
and finally, poor foreign relations with the Spaniards and natives in the New World, which gradually 
undermined colonial settlement.  
 
Overview of Colonies 
Welser Colony 
On 27th March 1528 Charles V, King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, granted a contract of 
privileges for the administration and exploitation of the province of Venezuela to Heinrich Ehinger 
and Hieronymus Sailer, two agents of the wealthy Welser merchant family from Augsburg, Germany. 
(Appendix 1 offers an historical background to the colonies in question, in the absence of 
substantive secondary literature). The Welser were to build two settlements of no fewer than three-
hundred colonists within two years, provide fifty miners for Spanish territories in the Caribbean and 
pay the royal fifth (by contributing one-fifth of all income), to the Spanish Crown, which was 
required by all Spain’s New World colonies.3 On 24th February 1529 Ambrose Alfinger arrived in the 
only existing Venezuelan town of Coro as the first Welser governor of the colony.4 (For biographies 
of the most important individuals involved in each colony, see Appendix 2) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Roanoke to James Towne: an archaeological and historical odyssey (Charlottesville, 1997); L. Miller, Roanoke: 
Solving the Mystery of the Lost Colony (New York, 2001); A.T. Powell, Grenville and the Lost Colony of Roanoke: 
the First English Colony of America (Leicester, 2011). 
3
 K. Haebler, Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser und ihrer Gesellschafter (Leipzig, 1903), p.162 
4
 Some debate exists over the name of Ambrose Alfinger. In some works, notably Haebler’s, he is referred to as 
Ambrose Ehinger, with the suggestion that he was the brother of the contract holder, Heinrich. However, most 
Spanish chroniclers refer to him as Alfinger or Dalfinger (the area of his birth) and it is probable that the use of 
the name Ehinger resulted from errors in transcription and translation over many years. Juan Friede explores 
the problem of Alfinger’s name. See: J. Friede, Los Welser en la Conquista de Venezuela (Caracas; Madrid, 
1961), pp. 166-8 
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 Map 1: Territorial demarcations of Venezuela and its Neighbours c. 1550 
Source: G. Simmer, Gold und Sklaven (Berlin, 2000), Appendix 
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Alfinger’s tenure as governor was characterised by two brutal entradas (missions of 
exploration and conquest) to the west of Coro, as he attempted to find a sea passage to the Far East, 
whilst simultaneously searching for the rumoured gold of the interior. The first, conducted in 1529, 
resulted in the foundation of the settlement of Maracaibo. (See Map 2) The second, between 1531 
and 1533, saw considerable plundering of native settlements, which ultimately led to Alfinger’s 
death in the Chinacota Mountains, and accumulated little wealth.5 (Map 3) Simultaneously, 
Alfinger’s deputy, Nikolaus Federmann, conducted an unauthorised southern mission from 1530 to 
1531 in search of a “South Sea”. His exploration would prove just as unsuccessful and profligate as 
Alfinger’s. (Map 2)  
Alfinger’s successor, Georg Hohermuth von Speyer, continued the entrada policy on his 
arrival in 1535, soon heading on a monumental three-year exploration of the Venezuelan interior 
with four-hundred-and-ninety men, again for little reward.6 (Map 3) On his return to Coro he began 
planning a new mission but died in 1540, before it could become a reality. During Hohermuth’s 
mission, Federmann conducted his second entrada, this time heading west. By late 1538 he had 
reached the province of Cundinamarca (later New Granada) at the same time as fellow 
conquistadores, Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada and Sebastian de Benalcazar.7 Ultimate jurisdiction for 
the rich province would be awarded to Santa Marta, the Spanish province neighbouring Venezuela, 
whose claim to the territory Quesada had staked.  
As the last German Captain-General of the province, Philipp von Hutten, prepared one final 
search for “El Dorado” in 1541, the Welser colony was coming under increasing scrutiny from 
Spanish royal officials because of its poor performance.8 Hutten’s entrada would spend over four 
years in the wilderness of Venezuela for no reward. Furthermore, both Hutten and his deputy, 
Bartholomaus Welser Jr., were murdered on their return in 1546 by a rogue Spanish solider named 
Juan de Carvajal. Carvajal had been sent by the Licenciate Juan de Frias to begin residencia 
                                                          
5
 G.F. Oviedo y Valdes, Historia General y Natural de las Indias, 1535-1541, 3 vols (Madrid, 1959), vol. 3, pp. 24-
31; Friede, Los Welser en la Conquista de Venezuela, pp. 208-9.  
6
 For Hohermuth’s governorship and exploration see Haebler, Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser, 
pp 222-245; Oviedo y Valdes, Historia, vol. 3,  35-46 
7
 J.I. Avellaneda, ‘The Men of Nikolaus Federmann: Conquerors of the New Kingdom of Granada’, The 
Americas, Volume 43(4) (1987) pp. 385-6 
8
 Although Von Hutten was never officially appointed governor, interim governor Bishop Rodrigo de Bastidas 
appointed him Captain-General in 1540, with the understanding that he would assume the governorship at a 
later date. 
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Alfinger – 1529-1530 
Federmann – 1530-1531 
 
 
Map 2: Ambrose Alfinger’s and Nikolaus Federmann’s First Entradas  
Source: G. Simmer, Gold und Sklaven (Berlin, 2000), Appendix 
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Alfinger – 1531-1533 
Hohermuth – 1535-1538 
Map 3: Ambrose Alfinger’s Second Entrada and Georg Hohermuth’s Entrada 
Source: G. Simmer, Gold und Sklaven (Berlin, 2000), Appendix 
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proceedings against the Welser colony, but had used his position to usurp power in an attempt to 
remove Venezuela from German control.9 
Although Carvajal was brought to justice, this was the effective end of the Welser colony in 
Venezuela. Legal disputes at the Council of the Indies in Madrid ensured the province remained 
under official Welser rule for a little longer, albeit under Spanish governors. However, their contract 
was finally revoked in 1556.10  
 
French Colony 
The French colony of 1541 developed from two earlier voyages of exploration of the St. 
Lawrence region in Canada by navigator Jacques Cartier. The first voyage, conducted in 1534 on the 
authority of King Francois I, resulted in the navigation and mapping of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, in 
addition to trading with several native groups.11 On the second voyage, during 1535-6, Cartier 
initially explored the St. Lawrence River as far as the native settlement of Stadacona (present-day 
Quebec). Here the French created a temporary fort to pass the Canadian winter. Despite opposition 
from the native Iroquoians of Stadacona, Cartier soon continued his exploration downriver to 
Hochelaga (Montreal) in search of the legendary Kingdom of Saguenay and a western route to the 
Far East.12 Cartier’s trip was unsuccessful, having been blocked from further advancement by the 
Lachine Rapids (See Map 4). With native relations deteriorating, the French returned home in the 
spring of 1536, after the ice had melted.13 
Before the French had left Canada, Cartier captured the Chief of Stadacona, Donnacona.14 
His tales of the riches of Saguenay would inspire a further French voyage to Canada, despite the 
limited findings so far. After war with the Habsburgs delayed Francois’s plans, he finally 
                                                          
9
 M.M. Lacas, ‘A Sixteenth-Century German Colonizing Venture in Venezuela’, The Americas, Volume 9(3) 
(1953) pp. 285-8 
10
 C.R. Johnson, The German Discovery of the World: renaissance encounters with the strange and marvelous 
(Charlottesville, 2008)  p. 188 
11
 For Cartier’s account of the voyage see: J. Cartier, H.P. Biggar & R. Cook, The Voyages of Jacques Cartier 
(Toronto; London; Buffalo, 1993) pp. 3-31 
12
 M. Bideaux, Jacques Cartier/Relations; édition critique par Michel Bideaux (Montreal, 1986) p. 89 
13
 For Cartier’s account of his second voyage see: J. Cartier, ‘Cartier’s Second Voyage, 1535-1536’ in Cartier, 
Biggar & Cook, The Voyages of Jacques Cartier, pp. 35-89 
14
 Cartier, ‘Cartier’s Second Voyage, 1535-6’, p. 84 
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Location of the French Cap-Rouge colony – situated on the north bank of the St. 
Lawrence near the St. Croix estuary and Stadacona 
Lachine Rapid 
Map 4: The St. Lawrence River and Cap-Rouge Colony 
Source: M. Bideaux, Relations/Jacques Cartier ; edition critique par Michel Bideaux 
(Montreal, 1986) 
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commissioned a third voyage of discovery to Cartier in October 1540.15 However, this commission 
was soon revoked in favour of one of colonisation and evangelisation, granted to Protestant 
nobleman Jean-Francois de la Roque de Roberval on 15th January 1541.16 Cartier was retained as 
master-pilot and began preparations for his voyage. 
Cartier left for Canada with five ships in May 1541, leading the first part of the colonial 
expedition, as Roberval remained in France to finish his preparations.17 On arrival, Cartier 
immediately began searching for Saguenay, whilst leaving a handful of men to complete the 
fortifications of his Charlesbourg-Royale colony, which had been established at Cap-Rouge, near 
Stadacona (Map 4).18 The exploration was unsuccessful, with the only “riches” attained by the 
mission proving to be mere fool’s gold and iron pyrites, not the “fine gold” and “diamants” Cartier 
had envisaged.19 The narrative of the mission cuts off shortly after Cartier’s return to the colony and 
all that is certainly known is that the French abandoned Charlesbourg-Royale around May 1542, 
having survived another Canadian winter. 
Roberval had finally left La Rochelle in April 1542 and sailed to Newfoundland, where he 
encountered the returning Cartier. Despite being requested to return to Canada with Roberval, 
Cartier “stole privily away” at night for France, although not before informing his commander that 
the colonial failure was the result of the “Savages, which went about dayly to annoy him.”20 Roberval 
continued to Cap-Rouge, where he ordered the construction of stronger fortifications, to be named 
France-Roy. Little is known of the short-lived colony, although the existing account describes the 
difficulties the French had in surviving the Canadian winter of 1542-3, as freezing weather, 
starvation and disease destroyed the morale of the colonists, despite Roberval’s attempts to instil 
discipline.21 On 5th June 1543 Roberval began his own attempt to pass the Lachine Rapids and head 
towards the supposed wonders of Saguenay. However, like Cartier, his attempt was futile and the 
narrative breaks off before his return to the settlement, where only thirty men had remained. 22  
Roberval returned to France in September 1543, bringing an end to French colonial ambitions in 
Canada for over half a century. (Appendix 3 provides a timeline of each colony)   
                                                          
15
 ‘Cartier’s Commission for his Third Voyage’ in Cartier, Biggar & Cook, The Voyages of Jacques Cartier, pp. 
135-138 
16
 ‘Roberval’s Commission’ in Cartier, Biggar & Cook, The Voyages of Jacques Cartier, pp. 144-151  
17
 M. Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 1524-1663, trans. P. Claxton (Toronto, 1973) pp. 40-1 
18
 R. Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of the English Nation, Volume XIII. 
America. Part II. (London, 1600) p. 152 
19
 J. Cartier, ‘Cartier’s Third Voyage, 1541’ in Cartier, Biggar & Cook, The Voyages of Jacques Cartier, p. 101 
20
 ‘Roberval’s Voyage 1542-3’ in Cartier, Biggar & Cook, The Voyages of Jacques Cartier, pp. 108-9 
21
 F. Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World (Boston, 1865) p. 206 
22
 J.L. Allen, ‘From Cabot to Cartier: The Early Exploration of Eastern North America, 1497-1543’,  Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, Volume 82(3) (1992) p. 517 
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Existing Literature and Sources 
The body of historical writing concerning the two colonies in question remains very thin, 
with few comprehensive English-language studies of either. This is perhaps unsurprising given that 
there is a dearth of primary evidence relating to each endeavour.  
Considering the Welser Colony was German-administered for at least eighteen years of its 
existence, there is a relative absence of original German-language sources pertaining to its history. 
The only such evidence that appears to have survived is the accounts of Nikolaus Federmann and 
Philipp von Hutten. Federmann’s Indianische Historia (1557) is primarily a traveller’s account of his 
first exploration of the Venezuelan interior between 1530 and 1531.23 Whilst it includes little 
information regarding the colonial administration of the time, the account offers a detailed insight 
into the Welser colonists’ first extensive contact with the natives of the region and suggests why 
future relations would become strained. Furthermore, it gives a vivid picture of the variable 
environment and terrain of sixteenth-century Venezuela, highlighting some of the difficulties of both 
exploring such a land and creating a sustainable settlement there. Von Hutten’s account, “Newe 
Zeytung” (1785), is less cohesive than Federmann’s, being merely a collation of some of his letters of 
correspondence with the Old World, together with a short narrative of his adventures under Georg 
Hohermuth.24 Nevertheless, the letters give rise to a number of concerns Hutten had about the 
future of the colony, particularly in relation to its potential for survival, therefore giving a different 
perspective to Federmann. Whilst such accounts are useful to historians studying the Welser in 
Venezuela, they hardly offer an exhaustive narrative of the colony’s history. Therefore, Spanish 
administrative documents must be consulted, as they are the only other primary sources relating to 
the colony. The Spanish became notorious for their extensive bureaucracy in the New World, with a 
multitude of legal documents, audits and reports concerning their colonies being transmitted back 
to the Council of the Indies in Madrid, where the performance of individual provinces was judged.25 
Although Venezuela was Welser-administered, it was still within overall Spanish jurisdiction and, 
consequently, royal officials filed reports to the Council about the progress of the colony. This has 
given contemporary historians a number of documents relating to the administrative and financial 
state of the Welser colony, housed in the General Archives in Seville. The majority of these 
documents have been published in Enrique Otte’s (ed.) Cedularios, providing easy access to this 
detailed evidence, which cannot be obtained from elsewhere.  
                                                          
23
 First published in 1557, Federmann wrote his account in the 1530s, sometime before his death in 1542. 
24
 Hutten’s account and letters were first published in 1785, although they were written during the period 
described. 
25
 J.L. Phelan, ‘Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Volume 5(1) (1960) pp. 50-54 
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Primary evidence of the French colonisation effort at Cap-Rouge is as scarce as in the case of 
the Welser. Historians have relied on two incomplete accounts, supposedly by Jacques Cartier and 
someone on the Roberval expedition, to obtain some idea of how events unfolded in the colony. 
These English-language accounts come from an entry in Richard Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations from 
the end of the sixteenth century. These had been translated from the Italian of Giovanni Battista 
Ramusio’s Navigationi et Viaggi (1550), which had purportedly derived from original French 
manuscripts. Whilst the Cartier account describes the French arrival in Canada, the establishment of 
the settlement, and the attempt to reach Saguenay, it breaks off before any reason can be given for 
the abandonment of Charlesbourg-Royale in 1542. The same problem occurs with the account from 
the Roberval mission, which again ends abruptly before the French left Canada in 1543. As a result, 
the majority of contemporary histories of the French colonising mission are very brief indeed.  
Nevertheless, other primary documents can be used to offer a more comprehensive interpretation 
on why the French abandoned their Canadian colony. Firstly, there are the narratives of Cartier’s 
first two voyages to Canada in 1534 and 1535-6 respectively. These are more detailed and extensive 
than the one of his third voyage and emphasise the environmental challenges of settling in Canada, 
as well as the deteriorating relations between the French and the natives, which impacted on the 
later colonising attempt. Secondly, H.P. Biggar has translated and collated Documents Relating to 
Jacques Cartier and the Sieur de Roberval (1930) from before and after the Canadian failure. These 
documents highlight the problems faced by the French in preparing for the colonising mission, as 
well as offering reports from fishermen and foreign spies suggesting why the French left Canada. 
Thirdly, the Cosmographie (1904) of Jean Alfonse, Roberval’s master pilot, offers a detailed 
description of the climatic conditions of Canada, although it gives little information directly related 
to the colony.26 Finally, material sources based on recent archaeological excavations at Cap-Rouge 
give a new insight into the French settlements there, including the strength of fortifications, the diet 
of the colonists and trading relations with the native people. Whilst no extensive narrative exists 
relating to the French colony in Canada, historians have often overlooked the other scanty, yet 
potentially valuable, primary evidence available today, which this thesis shall look to exploit.  
Other sources historians of the New World often make reference to are the great sixteenth-
century chronicles of the early European colonies. Unfortunately, neither Welser-Venezuela nor the 
French in Canada feature heavily in these informative works. The Welser are at least included 
extensively in Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo y Valdes’ La Historia General y Natural de las Indias 
(1542) and Juan de Castellanos’ Elegias (1588), which help establish the chronology of their 
administration of Venezuela, in the absence of any comprehensive first-hand account. Oviedo 
                                                          
26
 First published in 1904, it is likely that Alfonse wrote his Cosmographie during the 1540s. 
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typically constructed his history from testimonies of men who experienced the events in question, 
giving them a good weight of authority. Similarly, José de Oviedo y Baños’ Historia de la conquista y 
población de la provincia de Venezuela (1723)  embellishes Oviedo y Valdes’ narrative through the 
use of later testimonies.27 
The less appealing prospect of Canada, coupled with a general lack of French writing on the 
New World, meant few histories relating to the Canadian colony materialised in the immediate 
aftermath of the venture. Andre Thevet’s Singularitez de la France Antarctique (1557) and 
Cosmographie Universelle (1575), and Marc Lescarbot’s Histoire de la Nouvelle-France (1609) 
offering some additional detail to that included in Cartier’s narratives. Meanwhile, early Anglophone 
works on the French in Canada, like Francis Parkman’s Pioneers of France in the New World (1865) 
and Stephen Leacock’s Mariner of St Malo (1914) fail to bring any significant new evidence to light 
regarding the colony, and their imperialist tone makes interpretations of native-French relations 
particularly unbalanced.  
This failure of earlier historians to supplement the few existing primary sources on the 
French colony in Canada, has led to the reproduction of stale historical narratives relating to the 
venture. This has ensured that our understanding of the reasons for the colony’s failure has not 
been sufficiently enhanced. There are some exceptions. Marcel Trudel’s Histoire de la Nouvelle-
France (1963) looks beyond the incomplete narratives to the historical background of the colony, as 
well as the potential impact of Cartier’s earlier voyages on its failure.28 Meanwhile, Olive Dickason, in 
The Myth of the Savage (1984) and Bruce Trigger in Natives and Newcomers (1986) make use of 
anthropological methodology to focus on the native element of the French colony, the relations 
between the two groups, and how the French misunderstood pre-contact native societies.29 Whilst 
important interpretations, these works look at the French colony in isolation, without giving a 
comparative approach could offer a more comprehensive understanding.  
A similar problem can be identified with more contemporary histories on the Welser Colony, 
which are sparse in any case. Konrad Haebler’s Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser und 
ihrer Gesellschafter (1903), Juan Friede’s Los Welser en la Conquista de Venezuela (1961), Götz 
                                                          
27
 The Welser feature to a lesser extent in the chronicles of A.de Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia General de los 
Hechos de los Castellanos en las Islas y Tierra Firme del Mar Océano (1611) and P. de Aguado, Recopilación 
(Bogotá, 1906)  
28
 S.E. Morison gives an English-language study of the colony comparable to Trudel in, The European Discovery 
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Simmer’s Gold und Sklaven (2000) and Jörg Denzer’s Die Konquista der Augsburger Welser-
Gesellschaft in Sudamerika (2005) offer extremely detailed studies of the colonising effort based on 
the existing archives.30 However, there is no in-depth English-language study of the Welser and, 
indeed, any treatment of the colony is usually restricted to a couple of paragraphs in more general 
books about the history of Latin America. A partial exception is M.M. Lacas’s article,’ A Sixteenth-
Century German Colonizing Venture in Venezuela’ (1953), which gives an overview of the colony, 
albeit relying solely on the narratives of the chroniclers. 
Despite a paucity of primary sources, the underrepresentation of the Welser and French 
colonies in English academic literature is surprising, given the legacy they left.  Consequently, a 
comparative approach could help to offer greater insight into the failure of individual colonies by 
suggesting causes not immediately obvious from the original archives.  
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Chapter 1: Lack of Preparedness 
Any attempt to found and maintain a New World colony in the sixteenth century required 
careful preparation. Whilst preparing to enter unknown territories with unknown people was far 
from straightforward, quickly adapting one’s preparations on arrival was as important. However, the 
attempts by the Welser in Venezuela and the French in Canada demonstrate a notable lack of 
preparedness in terms of their geographical knowledge, colonist numbers, provisions, and 
leadership, which contributed to their failure.  
 
Inadequate Geographical Knowledge 
Harsh Climate 
North-Western Venezuela, where the Welser settlements were established, had only been 
tentatively explored before 1530, mainly by Juan de Ampies and his detachment of Spanish soldiers, 
who had been sent to halt the slave trade on the Venezuelan coast and establish amiable relations 
with the natives.31 Despite having no active participation in the New World up to this point, the 
Germans were in a privileged position to gain knowledge of its early development as “its wealthy 
cities, new universities, and numerous elites supported the most exuberant publishing industry in 
Europe.”32 Publications of Columbus, Vespucci, Cortes and others were readily available to the 
German elite, giving an indication of the geographical uniqueness of the New World and its 
inhabitants.33 Although little was reported on Venezuela, the German colonists would at least have 
been aware of the need for acclimatisation on arrival. However, in reality this was extremely 
difficult. Firstly, Governor Ambrose Alfinger was too keen to begin exploring the interior for riches, 
taking most of the colonists with him. Secondly, some degree of climate sickness and disease 
amongst the settlers was unavoidable. The first New World settlers on Hispaniola had their numbers 
depleted between 1493 and 1496 as a result of hunger and disease, both linked to the climate. 
Indeed, after a generation of settlement the European population on the island was still less than 
four-thousand, such was the mortality rate.34 This pattern would emerge throughout settlements 
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across the New World in the sixteenth century, causing thousands of European deaths.35 
Nevertheless, the poor location of Coro and Maracaibo accentuated the problem in the Welser 
colony. The Coro area was exceptionally dry and hot with few water sources and little vegetation, 
increasing the chances of starvation.36 Meanwhile, Maracaibo was located in a warm, damp area37, 
facilitating the spread of infectious disease and sickness, as witnessed to by the early death of 
Deputy Governor Bartholomaus Sailer and several other residents in 1529.38  
However, whilst the location of settlements was within the colonists’ control, something 
they could not have prepared for was the variable climate of Venezuela, which proved particularly 
hazardous on expeditions into the interior. The accounts of Federmann, Von Hutten and Oviedo all 
describe in detail the changing terrain of the interior, from damp, fertile valleys to dense jungle, to 
barren and freezing mountains. Before the colonists had time to adapt to one climatic phenomenon 
they moved to another, making mortality rates extremely high on the discovery expeditions (See 
Table 1), which proved disastrous for the already under-populated Welser colony. 
The climate the French colonists encountered in Canada could not have been more different 
from that of Venezuela, yet it was no less hostile. Unlike the Germans, the French did not possess a 
particularly advanced publishing industry and reports concerning the New World were rare.39 It is 
possible that the numerous French fishermen that had exploited the resources in the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence for several decades may have relayed climatic information to their countrymen. However, 
the only definite geographical knowledge the outgoing mission of 1541 had was that obtained on 
the previous two voyages of Jacques Cartier.  What was particularly unfamiliar to the French was the 
sudden change from the dry, mild climate they first encountered to the long winter that followed, 
and this is reflected in the accounts of Cartier. During his second voyage Cartier had described the 
area surrounding Cap-Rouge as “a fine country” comparable to France, before ultimately 
encountering a fierce winter, which contributed to the deaths of over twenty of his crew and 
depleted their meagre resources.40 Similarly, on the colonisation voyage, Cartier gave another 
prosperous account of the land to be settled, comparing its flora to France and suggesting it was an 
area of abundant natural resources.41 Despite his previous experience of the Canadian winter, 
Cartier seems to have been unable to comprehend the sudden climatic change from the autumn 
period, suggesting why a suitable store of provisions was never collected when the chance was 
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available. It is possible that Cartier believed his winter experience of 1535-6 was unique, and that 
Canada should share a comparable climate to France given its latitudinal similarity, on which 
sixteenth-century geographical thought placed great faith.42 Whether this was the case, Cartier’s 
expedition was not prepared for a repeat of the winter of his previous voyage.  
The severity of the Canadian winter is further detailed in the account of Roberval’s stay, as 
the settlers of France-Roy succumbed to cold, disease, starvation and ill-discipline.43 Such a dire 
situation emphasises how unprepared the colonists were to adapt to the bitter Canadian climate.  As 
with the Germans in Venezuela, the French would have found it difficult to master their 
environment, whatever knowledge they possessed. However, unlike the Germans, they at least had 
experience of the harshness of the climate they were settling, yet did not use this knowledge 
sufficiently for colonial preparation. 
 
“False Geography” 
Perhaps the most significant reason why Europeans attempted to settle, and persevered, in 
such hostile climates was the influence of “false geography”, pertaining to the potential acquisition 
of wealth. Colonists were far more likely to tolerate living in an inhospitable environment if there 
was a chance they could make their fortunes from it.44 This certainly appears the case in the Welser 
colony, as the early settlers hurried off with the German governors in search of the rumoured gold 
that was supposedly present in all tropical lands. Common belief amongst Europeans in the 
sixteenth century suggested that there existed in the tropics “a merciless heat *which+ 
forged...precious metals and stones.”45 However, the early Welser expeditions were not simply 
aimed at obtaining gold, but also at finding a sea passage to the Far East, where the Welser were 
already engaged in the lucrative spice trade through their Portuguese contacts.46 One of the reasons 
Ambrose Alfinger founded Maracaibo in a seemingly unsuitable area of swampland was because he 
believed that beyond the great lake lay a body of water that was connected to the Pacific Ocean and 
consequently offered a straightforward passage to the East.47 (See Map 5) Similarly, Nikolaus 
Federmann makes frequent reference to a “South Sea” in the account of his first entrada between 
1530 and 1531. Indeed, Federmann’s motive for his first enterprise was “to take a trip into the 
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interior towards the South Sea, in the hope that there was doing something profitable.”48 
Federmann read signs into every aspect of terrain that he was getting closer to his target, and he 
never questioned the existence of a Southern Ocean, so convinced he was of the validity of 
contemporary geographical thought.49 Federmann failed in his endeavour to find the “South Sea” 
and with it lost several important colonists to disease and native warfare, as a result of geographical 
rumour.   
 
 
 
The elusiveness of a new passage to the East diverted Welser interest back to the singular 
pursuit of acquiring the now legendary gold of the interior. Rumours were spread throughout the 
1520s and 1530s by both Europeans and natives on the South American coast of a legendary golden 
kingdom in the interior with a rich king, first identified as the “Meta” and subsequently as “El 
Dorado.” Tales spread of a king of the Chibcha people in Easter Colombia who had washed himself in 
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gold as part of a ceremonial ritual at Lake Guatavita during the previous century.50 Europeans turned 
this symbolic act into proof of extensive wealth, which was only fuelled by the Atahualpa ransom in 
Peru.51 The Welser colonists were just one group who diverted numerous resources and men away 
from their colonial centres in pursuit of this myth, which remained believable because of the 
geographical association between gold and the tropics.52 Consequently, the existence of “El Dorado” 
was never doubted, as is shown in Philipp von Hutten’s account of Georg Hohermuth’s mission, 
where any rumour of gold provoked great excitement in the author.53 Von Hutten also describes in 
one of his letters how a native cacique gave the Europeans “great news of gold and sheep.”54 
Bandelier recounted how in 1513 Vasco Nunez de Balboa was informed in Panama of the golden 
lands of the south, where large sheep (undoubtedly llamas) were used “as beasts of burden” to 
transport the gold.55 This is yet another example of how indications of genuine wealth, coupled with 
European mythologizing, inspired the likes of Hohermuth and Von Hutten (who conducted his own 
search for El Dorado from 154156)  to venture further into the hostile environment of the interior, 
despite being deprived of exact geographical locations for riches. In the process, they lost many men 
and provisions that could have proved invaluable to the survival of the Welser colony.  
The curse of “false geography” also played its part in the French failure, although to a slightly 
lesser extent than in Venezuela. Besides the myth of latitudinal similarity, the French were originally 
also confident of finding a western route to the Far East, just as Alfinger and Federmann had been. 
Indeed, the main purpose of Cartier’s first two voyages had been to find such a passage, building on 
the reconnaissance of Giovanni da Verrazano who believed he had seen the Pacific Ocean over a 
narrow strip of land whilst exploring the East Coast of North America for the French crown in 1524.57 
This search for a throughway to the East became interlinked with the mythical Kingdom of Saguenay, 
a supposedly rich land the natives claimed was due west of Hochelaga.58 The possibility of a golden 
kingdom existing in the harsh lands of Canada was a belief the French subscribed to. Indeed, such a 
                                                          
50
 See: A.F.A. Bandelier, The Gilded Man (El Dorado) and other pictures of the Spanish occupancy of America 
(New York, 1893) pp. 8-15 
51
 F. Merchant, ‘Legend and Fact about Gold in Early America’, Western Folklore, Volume 13(2/3) (1954) pp. 
172-3 
52
 Others included Diego de Ordaz (1531) and Alonso de Herrera (1534) from Paria, Gonzalo Pizarro from Peru 
(1539) and Hernan Perez de Quesada from Santa Marta (1540). 
53
 For example see P. Von Hutten, Schmitt & F.K. Von Hutten, Das Gold der Neuen Welt, pp. 67, 69  
54
 ‘Philipp von Hutten an den Kaiserlichen Rat Matthias Zimmermann: Brief aus Coro vom 30 Juli/30 Oktober 
1538’ in P. Von Hutten, Schmitt & F.K. Von Hutten, Das Gold der Neuen Welt, p. 100. (Original: “gaben sie uns 
groß Zeitung von Gold und Schafen“)  
55
 Bandelier, The Gilded Man, pp. 5-6.  
56
 J. Denzer, Die Konquista der Augsburger Welser-Gesellschaft in Sudamerika (1528-1556): historische 
Rekonstruktion, Historiografie und lokale Erinnerungskultur in Kolumbien und Venezuela (Munich, 2005) p. 169  
57
 Allen, ‘From Cabot to Cartier’, p. 514 
58
 Cartier, ’Cartier’s Second Voyage, 1535-6’, p. 65 
 24  
belief was later popularised by the great Jesuit historian Jose de Acosta who “felt that it was God’s 
design to place mineral wealth in the remotest parts of the world among the most primitive 
peoples” in order to entice more civilised persons there.59  However, Cartier’s failure to pass the 
Lachine Rapids during his second voyage ensured he could not dismiss the geographical rumours of 
both the Europeans and the natives.60 Consequently, both he and Roberval persisted in diverting 
human resources and provisions in pursuit of these myths during the attempt at colonisation. Here, 
real geographical barriers prevented the dismissal of “false geography”, just as in Venezuela, where 
treacherous mountains and dense forests prevented the advance of Hohermuth and Von Hutten to 
the supposed territory of “El Dorado”, ensuring the myth endured.  
The Welser and French were both hampered by inhospitable climates that brought disease 
and starvation. Nevertheless, their failure to adapt and learn from experience ensured they wasted 
valuable men and provisions in the pursuit of geographical rumour, rather than facing up to 
geographical reality by creating a sustainable base for colonial development in the first place. 
 
Insufficient Provisions 
Acquiring Provisions 
The climatic difficulties confronting arrivals in the New World put great importance on 
ensuring colonies were well-provisioned from the outset, to allow settlers time to adapt to their new 
environment. For the Welser in Venezuela this was an immediate problem because of their unique 
method of funding their colony. They employed a credit system, in which resources for the colony 
were sold to the settlers by the Welser themselves on credit, as a form of loan, with the expectation 
that debts would soon be repaid, with interest.61 This lack of direct funding placed the financial 
burden of the colony onto the colonists themselves.62 Consequently, it was up to them which 
provisions they wanted to buy, and these were not always in the best interests of the colony itself. 
On his arrival in Coro in 1535, Philipp von Hutten complained that the inhabitants were “quite 
miserable and poor and in great debt” to the Welser, having spent their credit on provisions for 
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missions into the interior, where they hoped to find gold with which to repay their debts.63  This 
ensured the main settlements of Coro and Maracaibo were constantly under-provisioned, with the 
colonists unaided by the high prices demanded by the Welser for goods.64 Compounding matters, 
the Welser were unable even to collect the dues owed to them effectively, with many debtors 
fleeing the colony without paying.65 The Spanish Crown had announced a decree in 1534, prohibiting 
unauthorised movement between South American territories.66 However, in reality this was hard to 
implement and was overlooked by men trying to escape debts in Venezuela. As a result, the Welser 
themselves became financially insecure and unable to provide basic goods to the already 
impoverished settlers, even on credit.67 It is therefore unsurprising that when Von Hutten returned 
to Coro in 1538, after three years on the Hohermuth mission, he declared the capital “a corrupt 
country... *where+ we lived almost with as much difficulty as on the trip.”68 A shortage of food and 
production provisions, coupled with the low settler numbers of the colony made it very difficult to 
preserve the main towns, let alone allow them to develop, particularly without significant native 
labour. 
The French in Canada did not suffer the same level of personal indebtedness as the 
Venezuelan colonists.  However, the French royal budget crisis, caused by years of intermittent 
warfare with the Habsburgs in the Italian Wars, prevented significant funding for the enterprise, 
which probably affected the provisions taken.69 In 1538, Cartier drew up a list recommending the 
provisions required for Canada, with regards to food, ships and armaments and “all other effects for 
two or three years.”70 It is difficult to determine whether Cartier got his wish. His account of the 
third voyage states on leaving St. Malo in May 1541, “five ships set sayle together well furnished and 
victualled for two yeare.”71 How “well furnished” the ships were is debatable, but the fact the 
mission lasted only a year suggests the mariner’s claims were overoptimistic. Cartier noted that a 
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significant amount of provisions were consumed on the outward voyage in 1541, as bad weather 
resulted in a lengthy crossing.72 Certainly, the fact that both the Cartier and Roberval groups quickly 
became reliant on bartering with the natives for food suggests provisions were inadequate, a point 
noted in the Roberval account as “they tooke a view of the victuals, and it was found that they fell 
out short.”73 Again, it must be questioned how Cartier in particular, as well as others who had 
previously wintered in Canada, failed to prepare adequately for survival in the hostile environment 
they were determined to settle. The most reasonable suggestions are a lack of funding, meaning the 
expeditions were severely under-provisioned, or a lack of discipline amongst the colonists, whereby 
an adequate supply was quickly depleted without considering the ramifications during the winter 
period. 
 
Re-Provisioning 
If provisions ran low in the New World, colonies had two potential solutions for replenishing 
supplies. They could either appeal to the parent country or make use of domestic sources. Although 
the Welser sent very few ships from the Old World to Venezuela during their administration of the 
colony, the Germans had links to Santo Domingo, which was at that time the administrative and 
economic centre of the Spanish New World. German merchants had played a key early role in 
financing Portuguese trade in the East and Spanish trade in the West during the early sixteenth 
century, and many German representatives followed the colonisers to their new lands.74 The Welser 
agents were no different, and contemporary accounts make frequent reference to requests for 
provisions from Venezuela to Santo Domingo, where the Welser had established a trading station in 
1526.75 This is most notable after the appointment of Georg Hohermuth as governor in 1534, 
suggesting provisions had been depleted by the disorderly rule of Ambrose Alfinger. Even before 
arriving in Venezuela, Hohermuth had a request for “ships, horses and maintenance as other things 
necessary for a good provision” approved by the Audiencia of Santo Domingo.76 After his 
unprofitable discovery mission, Hohermuth’s desperation for provisions was heightened, and the 
governor himself travelled to Santo Domingo in December 1539 in order to acquire a wide range of 
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stock for the colony.77 Such urgent reliance on the Welser trading station in the Caribbean is also 
evident from Philipp von Hutten’s accounts. Writing to a friend on his arrival in February 1535, Von 
Hutten explains “we always get fresh food from Santo Domingo”.78 Furthermore, by the summer of 
1538 he was anxiously “waiting all day on four ships, to get away with food and clothes from Santo 
Domingo.”79 Two points are important here. Firstly, the Welser had a strong merchant presence on 
Santo Domingo that allowed them to acquire goods near to Venezuela, yet their economic policy of 
passing the costs onto already indebted settlers meant they did not make the most of this 
arrangement. Secondly, the idea that the Venezuelan colonists were heavily reliant on Santo 
Domingo for such basics as food and clothing suggests a failure to make use of the domestic sources 
available to them. 
As Williamson realises, “it was patently not in *European colonists’+ interests to settle quietly 
to a peasant’s life tilling the soil,” when that is what most of them had left Europe to try and 
escape.80 Nevertheless, for a New World colony to survive it had to be at least partially self-
sufficient, meaning domestic cultivation was essential. As will be shown below, the Welser colonists 
failed to mobilise a native labour force effectively, yet were unwilling or too short on numbers to 
provide the necessary work themselves, creating the shortage Von Hutten highlights.  Although Coro 
and Maracaibo were not situated in ideal locations, Oviedo reported that Bishop Rodrigo de Bastidas 
had informed him that the land was fertile, ideal for cultivation of maize and fruits, and with a 
plethora of game to be hunted.81 Indeed, the Caquetio Indians had inhabited the regions around 
Coro and Maracaibo for centuries before Spanish arrival and had invariably produced a surplus of 
food.82 The failure to adapt to different cultivation methods and different crops was a problem that 
the Europeans frequently encountered in the New World and made native labour crucial. Von 
Hutten frequently complains of a lack of “wine” and “corn” in his accounts of Venezuela, yet suitable 
substitutes existed, such as maize and fermented root-drinks. This inability to make use of domestic 
provisions was a key reason why the Welser colonists failed to supply their settlements adequately, 
prohibiting them from growing, and at the same time increasing the debt of the province by over-
relying on imports.  
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The French in Canada can also be accused of failing to create a suitable level of self-
sufficiency in terms of provisions. Shortly after settling at Charlesbourg-Royale, Cartier claimed that 
the surrounding land was ideal for cultivation with vines that “grow of their owne accord” and 
cabbages “which grew and sprong up out of the ground in eight days.”83 His account is supported by 
that of Jean Alfonse, who suggested the grain grown was “as that of France” and that numerous 
types of fish could be taken from the waters.84 Yet the starvation endured through the winter 
months on both enterprises suggests such a plentiful supply was either fictitious or inappropriate for 
the climate. Indeed, archaeologists argue that “no evidence was found to confirm Cartier’s and 
Roberval’s reports that foodstuffs were grown around the settlement”.85 Olive Dickason has 
suggested that the native St. Lawrence Iroquoians effectively stored large amounts of food for the 
winter months and continued to hunt despite the freezing conditions.86 This had been evident on 
Cartier’s second voyage, when the French relied on buying native surplus food in order to survive the 
winter of 1535-6.87 The French obviously failed to learn from past experience and depleted their 
food provisions rapidly. Samuel de Champlain would learn from these mistakes in the seventeenth 
century, quickly clearing land for cultivation at Quebec before the Canadian winter, ensuring the 
French themselves produced food.88 
The failure of the French to create their own provisions was even more crucial than in 
Venezuela, as they did not have a way of importing regular supplies. Being the first French colony in 
the New World, the Canadian settlers could not rely on an already established presence and could 
certainly not trade with the Spanish there, due both to the distance and enmity between the two 
nations and their colonies. This ultimately meant any re-provisioning the French required would 
have to be sent from the Old World. However, the two attempts made failed. Firstly, Cartier was 
forced to wait too long for the Roberval mission to join him. He had immediately sent two ships back 
to France on arrival at Cap-Rouge to inquire “how Monsieur de Roberval was not yet come”,89 but by 
the time the General was leaving France, Cartier was heading home.90 Secondly, a purported voyage 
by Paul d’Aussillon in 1543 is the only example of Francois trying to replenish Roberval’s Canadian 
colony. However, it is unclear whether d’Aussillon ever reached Cap-Rouge and if he did it was 
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already too late.91 Given their knowledge of the financial difficulties of the Crown and their own 
experience of Canada, it is astonishing that the French failed to prepare for a greater degree of self-
sufficiency, knowing that re-supply from abroad was highly unlikely and would take such a long time.  
 
Provisions for Exploration 
A possible explanation for the rapid exhaustion of provisions in some New World colonies 
was because of their diversion for missions of discovery. The Welser governors took more men on 
their expeditions into the interior than they left behind in Coro and Maracaibo, requiring a high level 
of maintenance for the entradas in terms of provisions. In his Historia, Oviedo highlights the 
continual problem of acquiring food and other necessities for the Christians exploring Venezuela. 
Even as early as the founding of Maracaibo in 1529, a Spanish lieutenant, Luis Gonzalez de Leyva, 
was forced into the interior to search for supplies.92 During Ambrose Alfinger’s expedition between 
1531 and 1533 Oviedo relates how the “low supplies” of the Christians could not be supplemented 
by a “barren land.”93 He also references the “great suffering” experienced by Nikolaus Federmann 
and his men after eight days without replenishment in 1536.94 The constant need to acquire 
provisions in the midst of a hostile environment undoubtedly lengthened the discovery missions 
considerably, especially when taking into account the numerous rest stops taken by the suffering 
Europeans.95 Furthermore, the Welser explorers determined the best way to maintain provisions on 
an entrada was to plunder the native settlements they encountered, which had severe 
repercussions. In his Indianische Historia, Federmann distinguishes between the natives that 
“received us kindly”96 and gave the Europeans food, and those pueblos they 
“ambushed...unexpectedly” to take food by force.97 Once more, self-sufficiency was absent amongst 
the European colonists and the wastage of supplies on their expeditions only left their settlements 
more destitute and unable to produce. Furthermore, the loss of horses in the interior undoubtedly 
slowed the entradas down, diminished the European threat towards the native populations and 
therefore potentially reduced the economic worth of Welser exploration, which they relied on so 
heavily for wealth accumulation.  
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Whilst such exploratory endeavour was not as widespread during the French stay in Canada, 
the division of resources between discovery missions and the forts at Cap-Rouge contributed to the 
depletion of provisions. Cartier’s suggestion in his account that the French had adequate resources 
for two years was unlikely to be factoring in the provisions required for his attempted trip to 
Saguenay, which was repeated by Roberval in 1543. Within weeks of arrival Cartier provisioned two 
boats “furnished with men and victuals” and set off down the St Lawrence towards Hochelaga.98 
After encountering difficulties trying to pass the Lachine Rapids the expedition began to run low on 
food and, as so often with the Welser, the French became reliant on native hospitality.99 However, 
their refusal to eat the unsalted meat of their hosts forced them to turn back, their mission having 
failed and wasted a significant portion of the provisions needed for the fort development at 
Charlesbourg-Royale.100 Roberval similarly failed in his quest for Saguenay, losing “eight men and 
one Barke drowned” in the process.101 Such wastefulness for no reward was a key cause of failure for 
the French colony, as an already under-provisioned fort became further deprived, leading to over-
reliance on, and confrontation with, the natives, which contributed to the untenable situation.  
The provisioning and re-supply of the Welser and French colonies took different paths, yet 
resulted in similar outcomes. The Welser had the capability to exploit their privileged trading 
reputation and monetary power in Europe to finance the colony outright. Indeed, their extensive 
cash loans to Charles V for his colonial endeavours in the New World shows the Welser could have 
provided a more stable funding base for Venezuela. However, they chose to follow their mercantile 
nature by implementing a credit system, effective for smaller commercial projects, yet unsuited to 
large-scale colonisation. The French had little option for re-provision and were not helped by the 
political situation in Europe. However, both colonies failed to take advantage of native supplies, 
ignoring the value of self-sufficient cultivation and wasting precious resources on long and 
unsuccessful discovery missions.  
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Insufficient Colonists 
Inadequate Numbers 
The inadequacy of Welser and French provisioning is further exposed by the fact that neither 
colony maintained large populations. Only three-hundred men accompanied Ambrose Alfinger to 
Venezuela in 1529, adding to the few men left in Coro by Juan de Ampies, who had been pacifying 
the region.102 For such a large territory, with as yet undefined borders, such a number was 
insufficient for long-term settlement, especially given that the Welser were supposed to establish 
two stable settlements of three-hundred people under the conditions of their capitulation. This 
shortage was compounded by the fact that all the new colonists were men, and within six months 
the majority of them were exploring with Governor Alfinger. The indentured nature of the majority 
of the colonists, created by the Welser credit system, accentuated the need for instant wealth. They 
therefore had little choice but to comply with the ambitious entrada policy of the governors. Many 
of them were experienced in this capacity, having been to other parts of the New World and fought 
in the Italian Wars.103 However, it left the colony devoid of a sufficient number of people to look 
after primary production and construction, on which any sustainable settlement must rely. 
Unbelievably, only three more shipments of settlers from the Old World would arrive in 
Venezuela during Welser rule. In January 1530, one-hundred-and-twenty-three men arrived in the 
colony via Santo Domingo. However, the majority of these potential settlers soon left the province 
to return to Hispaniola after confrontation in Coro, meaning the Venezuelan population barely 
increased.104 A second shipment arrived in April 1530, meanwhile, carrying several hundred 
colonists, the majority of whom appear to have joined the Welser entradas.105 It would be five years 
before the final shipment, during which time the mortality rate in Venezuela soared to forty-nine per 
cent, as men died on expeditions to the interior, succumbed to disease in the tropical climate, or fell 
prey to starvation that plagued the underdeveloped province.106 (See Table 1) When Georg 
Hohermuth finally arrived as governor in February 1535 he brought with him six-hundred settlers, 
which should have boosted the under-populated and under-producing towns of Coro and 
Maracaibo.107 Nevertheless, Hohermuth took four-hundred-and-ninety men on his three-year search 
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for gold just months later; ensuring the potential for colonial development remained low with such 
depleted numbers in the capital.108 By 1536, Coro was a “poor affair”, according to the Bishop 
Entrada Number Survivors Survival Rate Notes 
Alfinger (1) 200 100 50%  
Alfinger (2) 170 40 23.5% Including the death of Alfinger 
Federmann (1) 114 100 87.7%  
Hohermuth 490 150 30.6%  
Federmann (2) 300 106 35.3% The majority of the survivors remained 
in New Granada, never returning to 
Venezuela 
Von Hutten 100 40 40% Included the death of Von Hutten and 
Welser 
Table 1: Survival rate of the Welser Entradas. The table does not take into account the numerous natives that 
must also have died on these missions. 
Source: K. Haebler, Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser und ihrer Gesellschafter (Leipzig, 1903); J. 
Denzer, Die Konquista der Augsburger Welser-Gesellschaft in Sudamerika (Munich, 2005); A.F.A. Bandelier, The 
Gilded Man (New York, 1893) 
Bastidas, with only fifty temporary huts, whilst Maracaibo was soon to be abandoned, and its mere 
thirty inhabitants evacuated.109 Considering that Christopher Columbus took fifteen-hundred men of 
varying social classes and occupations to populate the comparatively small island of Hispaniola in 
1493, the numbers for the vaster Welser colony appear even more insufficient.110  Such low figures 
highlight the difficulties of both recruiting and maintaining men in the destitute colony of Venezuela. 
What became a more acute problem was that the majority of the colonists in Welser-
governed Venezuela were Spanish. Even on the few shipments from the Old World, there appear to 
have been few of the Welser’s fellow Germans. Most men were recruited in Seville or the Canary 
Islands, rather than inland Europe. It is certainly possible that the religious turmoil caused by the 
Reformation may have hindered recruitment from the German territories. The Welser hometown of 
Augsburg, as well as neighbouring Ulm, where many Company employees came from, voted to join 
the Protestant Schmalkaldic League111 in the 1530s, defying Charles V’s Catholic imperialism.112 It is 
likely that the pro-imperialist Welser wished to avoid unnecessary dissent in their colony by 
refraining from hiring their religiously-suspect townsmen. However, employing men in Seville was 
also more convenient for the Welser. They had merchants inhabiting the city who could find the 
necessary number of men from amongst a Spanish population more familiar with the idea of 
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emigration.113 Consequently, German minority rule was established early and was exacerbated by 
later recruitment in the colony. Without regular shipments from the Old World, the Welser used 
their trading connections in Santo Domingo to enlist men closer to Venezuela. Given that the vast 
majority of settlers in Santo Domingo were Spanish, this form of recruitment only increased their 
majority in Venezuela. Indeed, a good example of the settler origins can be detected from the group 
of explorers who accompanied Nikolaus Federmann to Cundinamarca in 1536. Out of the forty-five 
men whose place of birth is known, thirty-nine originated from Spain compared to two from German 
territory.114 Throughout their rule the Welser governors were vulnerable to the Spanish majority, 
brought about by their recruitment policy.  
As with the Welser, the French were attempting to settle a geographical area of unknown 
proportions, except they had no neighbouring European provinces to concern themselves with. So 
whilst they did not have to worry about colonists defecting, they needed to bring enough men to 
create a large settlement and French presence from scratch. The confused nature of the colonial 
attempt, with the expedition effectively split into two parts, has made it unclear exactly how many 
colonists went with Cartier and Roberval. Various spy reports and fishermen’s testimonies exist, 
varying greatly in their estimations. One Spanish spy report, surprisingly supported by Marcel Trudel, 
suggests fifteen-hundred men and women accompanied the expedition to Canada.115 Given the 
relatively modest size of the archaeological remains of the settlements at Cap-Rouge, and the 
problems of recruitment the French suffered, this appears highly fanciful and politically 
motivated.116 It is probable that the Spanish spy was trying to force Charles V to take action against 
these “intruders” in the New World, by exaggerating their potential threat. A more conservative and 
probable estimate of numbers, based on the testimony of Newfoundland sailor Robert Lefant, is that 
Cartier took some three-hundred settlers with him.117 Meanwhile, the Roberval account suggests the 
general was accompanied by two-hundred men a year later.118  
The failure of Cartier and Roberval to conjoin their expeditions means it is unlikely that there 
were ever any more than three-hundred French colonists at Cap-Rouge. Given that both Cartier and 
Roberval took a significant number of their colonists in search of the riches of Saguenay, the few 
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people left behind would undoubtedly have found it difficult to continue construction of the 
fledgling settlements, whilst producing food and providing defence against increasingly hostile 
natives. However, such concerns do not appear to have crossed the leaders’ minds judging from 
their narratives. Considering that Cartier had carefully outlined all the men necessary for a long-term 
stay in Canada in 1538, including a variety of craftsmen and primary producers, it is surprising he 
deprived Charlesbourg-Royale of so many of them at such a crucial period.119 
In the following century, Samuel de Champlain would establish the first enduring French 
colony in Canada through a permanent core of settlers looking after production, with constant 
recruitment from the Old World, which Champlain himself lobbied for.120 Such re-supply was absent 
from the Cap-Rouge settlement. The resumption of hostilities with the Habsburgs in 1542 would not 
have helped, but the enthusiasm Champlain had for colonisation also appears absent amongst the 
leaders. Cartier was eager to return home with his supposed “gold” and “diamonds” but nothing 
suggests he wanted to return to the colony. With so many tasks necessary to build a colony from 
scratch, unaided by an alienated native populace nearby, and the failure of Cartier and Roberval to 
join forces, the French realistically never had the numbers to construct a sustainable settlement and 
explore for wealth simultaneously. 
 
Lack of Appeal 
A significant reason behind the failure to populate Venezuela and Canada adequately was 
their lack of appeal to settlers. For Welser-Venezuela, this problem was relative to the other settled 
provinces in Spanish America. After all, Venezuela was part of what Hugh Honour calls “the New 
Golden Land,” which had been associated with fabulous wealth, especially gold, ever since 
Columbus’ first reports of the New World and the subsequent Aztec conquest.121 Therefore, it is 
probable that some individuals were attracted to the province in the hope of striking lucky, as the 
large proportion that went with the German governors on their missions to the interior attest to. 
Nevertheless, the rumoured wealth of Venezuela was undoubtedly far less appealing than the 
confirmed wealth of Mexico, Peru and, after 1539, New Granada, which attracted far more settlers, 
often with their families.122 The Welser could not achieve this stable base in Venezuela and their 
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own erratic administration, based on the unfavourable credit system, probably made the province 
even less desirable to the predominantly Spanish settlers coming from the Old World and Santo 
Domingo. Furthermore, despite preventative laws, many colonists are known to have fled 
Venezuela, either to the “golden lands” of the West or the Eastern provinces of Paria, Cubagua and 
Margarita where slave-trading and pearl fishing thrived.123 These provinces not only offered greater 
wealth but more stability, with their better-populated and productive towns, which were absent 
from Venezuela during Welser rule.  
For the French, Canada was simply an unappealing prospect for Europeans. Rumours of the 
bitter cold, scurvy and starvation that ravaged Cartier’s second voyage in 1535-6 had probably 
reached French fishing ports by the time of the colonial expedition.124 Certainly, the fact that Cartier 
and Roberval were forced to recruit at least fifty convicts – not the most willing colonists in any case 
– highlights the lack of enthusiasm for the project.125 Rumours of a golden land may have spread, yet 
Cartier had brought no actual evidence from the Kingdom of Saguenay, unlike the golden and 
obsidian ornaments that had made their way back from Spanish America to confirm the presence of 
riches. For those living away from the seaboard, little knowledge of Canada would have been 
available, since none of Cartier’s narratives from his previous voyages were printed before 1545.126 
Furthermore, with French agricultural production at an all time high amongst the rural population 
during the 1530s, there was no incentive to venture abroad with little promise of betterment.127 
 
Inadequate Leadership 
Absence from Settlement 
The unsuitability of the colonist situation in Venezuela and Canada increased the need for 
strong leadership in the Welser and French colonies. However, this was not forthcoming. On his 
arrival in Venezuela in February 1529, Governor Ambrose Alfinger settled at the only established 
town in the province, Coro. Like many of the first towns in South America it was made-up of 
temporary buildings and mud streets, and, being isolated on the North coast, was situated poorly for 
exerting influence over the vast province.128 However, instead of remaining to oversee the 
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development of Coro, Alfinger soon commenced an exploration mission to the west, leaving the 
Spaniard Luis Sarmiento behind as his deputy.129 During this period, the new settlers remaining in 
Coro were without their appointed governor, undoubtedly creating uncertainty and a lack of 
discipline amongst people trying to adapt to an alien land. Later in 1529, whilst on his expedition, 
Alfinger founded Maracaibo, on the shores of the great lake. Juan Friede has suggested Alfinger 
intended this to be his new capital.130 However, the fact that the governor soon departed Maracaibo 
to continue exploring, leaving Simon de Beteta and only a handful of men behind to fortify the new 
village, suggests a lack of concern for settlement. 131 Indeed, Maracaibo’s abandonment, at a point of 
destitution in 1536, shows the real importance attributed to it by the Welser governors.  
Additionally, the vast distances between settlements in the expansive Venezuelan interior, 
coupled with an undeveloped road system, meant communication within the colony was extremely 
problematic.132 With the governor at neither one of the two settlements, it is unsurprising that 
contract holder Heinrich Ehinger attempted to replace Alfinger, whose whereabouts was unknown, 
with his brother Georg in January 1530. This led to several days of tension in Coro between the 
opposing forces of Georg Ehinger and Deputy Sarmiento, who was suspicious of any intruders in the 
province, and it brought disharmony and uncertainty to the colony.133 Sarmiento resisted Ehinger’s 
claims and forced him and his one-hundred-and-twenty-three men to depart Venezuela. 
Nevertheless, a similar attempted usurpation occurred in April when Hans Seissenhofer arrived from 
the Old World, also claiming to have the backing of the contract holders to replace the absent 
Alfinger. It would take the return of Alfinger from his first entrada shortly afterwards to put an end 
to this challenge.134 Nevertheless, such strife in Coro forced the renegotiation of the royal 
capitulation from the Ehinger to the Welser name to prevent similar events from reoccurring, which 
resulted largely because of the absence of Governor Alfinger.135 Later, during his second entrada, 
Alfinger left Bartolomé de Santillana as his deputy in Coro. He subsequently carried out systematic 
abuse of the native population, leading to severe repercussions for the colony and indictment for 
Santillana.  
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Alfinger’s absences were also typical of his successors at the head of the Welser colony.  
Georg Hohermuth remained in Coro for only three months on arrival in February 1535 before 
beginning his three-year search for riches in the interior. A letter from Bishop Bastidas to Emperor 
Charles V, dated 2nd April 1538, highlights the concern for Governor Hohermuth who: “on May 12th 
this year, will be three years since he left Coro.” The Bishop also voices anxiety over Hohermuth’s 
deputy Nikoluas Federmann, who had been ordered to re-supply the “uninhabitable” fledgling 
settlement at Cabo de la Vela, but had been absent since December 1536.136 The detrimental affect 
the absence of the governor had on the Welser colony is evident and was worst in the case of Philipp 
von Hutten, who was present in Coro for less than ten per cent of his tenure (See Table 2). While he 
searched for the fabled “El Dorado”, the colony effectively collapsed in his absence.  
 
None of the Welser-appointed governors came close to spending even half of their term in 
the capital Coro or any other settlement. It was only when Licenciate Tolosa was given temporary 
charge by the Council of the Indies in 1546, after the murder of Hutten, that some stability and 
progress was brought to the colony by the governor. During his short tenure, Coro was repopulated, 
the town of Tocuyo was developed, trade links were established with neighbouring provinces, and a 
new settlement on the coast at Burburuata was founded (See Map 1).137 More significantly, his 
constant presence in the capital (by now Tocuyo) centralised authority, allowing for more efficient 
discipline and delegation of tasks to the colonists, which became the hallmark of Spanish 
administration in the New World. 
The French colony at Cap-Rouge had a far shorter duration than the Welser in Venezuela, 
leaving less time for absence of the leader. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Roberval, appointed 
“head, leader, and captain of the said enterprise” was not even present during the initiation of the 
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Governor Time as Governor 
(Months) 
Time Spent at Capital 
(Months) 
Percentage at Capital 
(%) 
Ambrose Alfinger 51 13 25.5 
Georg Hohermuth 64 24 37.5 
Philipp von Hutten 63 6 9.5 
Licenciate Tolosa 30 28 93.3 
Table 2: Time Spent in Capital by Welser Governors of Venezuela. Note: Philipp von Hutten was 
never officially appointed Governor, although he was the highest-ranking Welser official in the colony 
after 1540. 
Source:  K. Haebler, Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser und ihrer Gesellschafter (Leipzig, 
1903) 
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colony in the late summer of 1541.138 To compound matters Jacques Cartier, who was originally 
commissioned as captain-general and led the expedition in the absence of Roberval, left the 
Charlesbourg-Royale colony three weeks into fortification in search of the mythical Kingdom of 
Saguenay, leaving only a lieutenant in charge.139 Whilst no documentary evidence exists to describe 
the attempts to create a settlement in the absence of the two leaders, the fact Charlesbourg-Royale 
was abandoned in the spring of 1542 suggests significant problems were encountered. This is 
unsurprising considering the colonists were without authoritative leadership in their first few 
months in an unknown land (as occurred with the original Welser settlers in Coro). When Roberval 
arrived to re-establish the colony as France-Roy in July 1542, a more concerted effort appears to 
have been made to create a strong settlement.140 Roberval, an expert in fortification who had 
overseen mining projects in Europe on behalf of King Francois141, stayed with the colony during its 
first winter, overseeing its construction. Nevertheless, by June 1543 Roberval too was on the search 
for Saguenay, leaving only thirty men, under a Monsieur de Royeze, at an uncompleted France-Roy, 
similar to the experience of the settlers at Maracaibo under the Welser in 1529.142 The colony was 
abandoned shortly after Roberval’s return, suggesting his absence played a contributing factor in the 
failure of the enterprise. 
 
Explorers not Colonists 
The continued absences of the Welser governors and French lieutenants can reasonably be 
explained by an exploratory desire amongst the expedition leaders, which overrode their 
responsibility to colonisation. All the Welser governors embarked on costly and lengthy missions into 
the vast Venezuelan interior, driven by myths of “El Dorado” and the successes of the conquests of 
the Aztecs in Mesoamerica and Incas in the Andes.143 Indeed, it is hard to argue against the 
exploratory achievements of Alfinger, Federmann, Hohermuth and Hutten whose enthusiasm for 
journeying led them to “discover” vast tracts of previously unknown land. However, this ultimately 
conflicted with their appointed duty, which was to ensure the Welser colony in Venezuela survived 
and flourished.144 The Germans typified the conquistador spirit, with constant adventuring and 
warring with native tribes. However, their determination to attain the riches that were generally 
thought to exist in the tropics led them to spend far too long away from the centre of the colony, 
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making it hard to judge areas needing attention and weakening Welser authority in Venezuela in the 
process. 
In the French case, Jacques Cartier is the perfect example of an explorer forced to become a 
colonial leader. His reputation had been established with his previous voyages to Canada between 
1534 and 1536, which had no pretences of colonial enterprise.145 Although it is difficult to establish 
the motives of historical figures, Cartier’s persistence in trying to find a route past Hochelaga to the 
Kingdom of Saguenay, suggests he never gave up on his original desire to find a western route 
through North America  to the riches of Asia. Indeed, at the beginning of his third account, Cartier 
fails to mention anything about a colonising mission, instead focusing on the discovery of new land 
and the “great riches” of Saguenay.146 Dividing the leadership between Roberval, remaining in 
France, and Cartier, a born explorer, was always going to entail this risk. Yet, poor preparation and a 
lack of foresight made it a reality. Whilst Roberval himself was no explorer, he was a flamboyant 
courtier in a ruinous financial position and therefore it is little surprise he also chased the fabled 
Saguenay.147 Without a stable and well-provisioned settlement first, such missions were 
irresponsible, although something many colonising expeditions fell prey to. Even Christopher 
Columbus, the most famed of all explorers, neglected his governing duties on Hispaniola to continue 
his search for a Western route to Asia. However, in Columbus’ case, the Spanish had quickly 
established a large settlement with numerous royal officials experienced in administration, ensuring 
the colony survived despite him. The Welser and French did not have such a luxury. 
 
Minority Rule 
The increasingly Spanish character of the Welser colony, brought about by the Company’s 
recruitment policy, created a further problem for the German governors. To maintain control over a 
virtually foreign settlement without stirring nationalist tension must have been a constant dilemma 
for the Welser authorities and the frequent absences of their governors would have made the 
Germans easy scapegoats for any problems amongst the settlers. Furthermore, the contractual 
dispute that dogged the colony between 1529 and 1531 divided the German camp between those 
supporting the Ehinger family, merchants of the Company who signed the original capitulation with 
Hieronymus Sailer, and the Welser. Such disunity amongst minority rulers was not advisable and 
ultimately led to greater Spanish interference within Venezuela, as royal officials were forced to 
mediate the contract dispute, as well as the strife caused by the actions of Alfinger’s deputy, 
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Bartolome de Santillana.148 It is evident from Royal Audiencia documents and correspondence from 
Venezuela that there was a clear animosity towards the “Alemanes” from Spanish colonists and 
authorities in the New World, who felt “their” territory had been invaded by a foreign power.149  
Whilst the French did not have to worry about a multinational expedition in Canada, a form 
of minority rule still existed. Roberval was a renowned Protestant, who had been commissioned to 
found a colony that would supposedly lead to a “growth of our mother the Holy Catholic Church”, 
through conversion of the native Iroquoians.150 Whilst Francois’ promise of evangelization has now 
been widely accepted by historians as a political ruse to win support from the papacy for his 
expedition, the religious element of the colony should not be overlooked.151 Given that Roberval’s 
commission had replaced the one previously awarded to Cartier, it is possible their religious 
differences increased animosity between the two supposed leaders of the colonial attempt.152 
Indeed, when returning from the abandoned Charlesbourg-Royale settlement, Cartier failed to 
inform Roberval at their Newfoundland meeting place of the cure for scurvy, which had killed a 
number of his own men on his second voyage.153 This reflects the internal rivalry that appears to 
have existed between Roberval and his “subordinate” Cartier, whose personal, and possibly 
religious, animosity led to the failure to exchange such vital climatic details.154 As a result, Roberval 
lost about fifty men to the disease during the winter of 1542-3, depleting an already small group of 
colonists simply because of the failure to communicate precious geographical knowledge.155   
Additionally, recent archaeological excavations of Roberval’s France-Roy settlement suggest 
a distinct separation between the noblemen on the mission and the rest of the colonists, based on 
the high concentration of valuable objects found in one section of the fort.156 Francois had 
encouraged Roberval to take “other persons of excellent character” - most likely noblemen and 
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courtiers - with him to Canada.157 The probability of Roberval selecting fellow Protestants as 
companions is high and therefore the division within the colony would have been along both social 
and religious lines, undoubtedly causing resentment amongst the poorer Catholic majority. The 
rigidly accepted social hierarchies in France during the sixteenth century would have made 
acceptance of noblemen and their privileges on the mission easier. However, the new religious 
tension appearing in the country may have been evident on the expedition because of Roberval’s 
leadership. Consequently, Francois’ decision to place a Protestant nobleman in charge of the mission 
is unlikely to have contributed to a strong morale and discipline amongst the colonists as they tried 
to survive the bitter Canadian winter. 
 
Such a decision by Francois to commission a Protestant to take charge of a largely Catholic 
expedition typifies the poor preparation and lack of foresight that characterised the French and 
Welser colonies. In addition to placing such faith in questionable geographical “knowledge”, both 
before and after their colonies began, the Welser and French authorities were inadequately 
prepared to settle and adapt in hostile environments, whilst at the same time attempting to conduct 
discovery expeditions. 
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Chapter 2 – Lust for Riches 
False geography led governors and colonists on risky missions of exploration, leading to a 
neglect of colonial settlements and fortifications, the wastage of men and provisions, and a high 
outlay of capital. Nevertheless, sheer individual determination and economic necessity often 
ensured such missions continued, sometimes resulting in great rewards for certain provinces in the 
New World. However, in the Welser and French colonies, the desire for quick profit and exploitation 
at the expense of colonial development, as well as poor communication and transportation 
networks, created the conditions for failure, compounding the original risks of embarking on such 
ventures. 
 
Desire for Quick Profit 
Plunder or Commerce? 
On arrival in Venezuela Ambrose Alfinger and his men quickly set the pattern for the 
economic history of the colony. From the middle of 1529, Alfinger and his charges plundered the 
native settlements surrounding Coro up to the foundation of Maracaibo, some forty leagues away.158 
The Welser would later be accused in the legal proceedings they faced at the Council of the Indies in 
Madrid that Alfinger’s destructive behaviour prevented the exploitation of fertile land worth about 
thirty-three thousand pesos a year.159 This typifies the Welser economic approach; quick and 
ultimately less profitable gain rather than sustainable development. Concurrent with the plunder of 
native settlements was the snatching of the natives themselves to be sold into slavery on the island 
of Hispaniola, where the Indian population had been decimated. Slave-raiding had been occurring 
along the Venezuelan coast for several decades160 and the Welser were given the right in 1530 to 
take natives as slaves in “just war”; something they subsequently abused.161 Again, this was hardly a 
sustainable strategy, yet was necessary in the eyes of the settlers to free themselves from 
indebtedness to the Welser, whilst the Company itself was grateful for any repayment, given their 
original expenditure.162 
Unsurprisingly, this approach led to the neglect of other potential revenue sources, which 
could have served the colony well into the future. Aside from the failure to organise agricultural 
                                                          
158
 J. Oviedo y Baños, The Conquest and Settlement of Venezuela, trans. J.J. Varner  (Berkeley; Los Angeles; 
London, 1987) p. 18 
159
 Friede, Los Welser en la Conquista de Venezuela, p. 445 
160
 G. Moron, A History of Venezuela (London, 1964) p. 32 
161
 Friede, Los Welser en la Conquista de Venezuela, p. 545 
162
 Denzer, Die Konquista der Augsburger Welser-Gesellschaft, p. 160 
 43  
production, the Welser foolishly neglected to exploit the lucrative pearl banks of Cabo de la Vela, 
which lay at the westernmost point of the province, on the border with Santa Marta (See Map 1). 
The Spaniards had already shown the potential value of pearl-fishing in the eastern territories of 
Margarita and Cubagua in the 1520s.163 In an attempt by the Spanish Crown to replicate this success, 
the Welser colonists were given a license to sell “gold, silver and pearls” found in Venezuela.164 
However, the Company’s failure to act on this ordinance led to censure from the Crown in 1536, 
which ordered the Welser to construct a fort at “the pearl fishery in the Cabo de la Vela, which is 
something very rich and important.”165 Although that same year Nikolaus Federmann set up a 
temporary settlement at the Cape under Georg Hohermuth’s orders, he soon abandoned it to begin 
his illicit western mission to Cundinamarca, leaving the area open to exploitation by other 
provinces.166 Despite repeated warnings from the Crown, the Welser neglected Cabo de la Vela and 
by 1543 jurisdiction of the region had passed to Santa Marta, whose inhabitants had already 
established the permanent settlement of Riohacha on the Cape. 
The Welser similarly failed to take advantage of their mining expertise and the privileges 
they received from the Crown for engaging in such practices in the New World. They were excused 
from paying the royal fifth on gold extracted from mines for five years by a concession of 1531,167 
and had agreed the rights to mining in the province of Santa Marta before arrival in Venezuela.168 
For a Company with such extensive mining experience in Europe, it is astonishing the Welser never 
engaged in mining or smelting activities in Venezuela or Santa Marta, especially after the gold-rich 
New Granada was awarded to the latter.169 Once more, it was too lengthy a procedure to establish 
mining centres for the Welser governors, when it seemed feasible to rob already-extracted gold 
from the native population. Such missed opportunities bring into question the Welser’s motives for 
their colony. Were they looking to create a sustainable province for European habitation? Or were 
they merely using Coro and Maracaibo as base camps for a series of entradas in the hope of striking 
gold, before returning their attentions to the Old World? It is possible that the original vision of the 
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colony changed after rumours of great wealth, combined with a populace indebted by the Welser 
credit system, led the colonists to pursue plunder over development. Certainly, their failure to 
engage in commercial enterprise negated the chances of creating a trade network with the ever-
expanding Spanish provinces and ensuring a ready supply of essential commodities to their own 
settlements. This would have to wait until the Licenciate Tolosa took command of the province in 
1546, when Welser control of Venezuela was all but finished.170  
Contrary to the Welser approach in Venezuela, the French in Canada refrained from 
plundering the surrounding native settlements, doubtless aware of their importance in providing 
food and other necessities to the Europeans. Indeed, the French originally pursued a trade policy 
with the native Iroquoians, which had begun in the Gulf of St. Lawrence on Cartier’s first visit in 
1534.171 Trade and bartering had long been the foundation for French-Native relations in Canada, 
which the Breton and Norman fishermen plying their trade in the Gulf had helped initiate several 
decades beforehand. Cartier attempted to carry this policy up the St. Lawrence to the Stadaconans 
and Hochelagans on his second voyage. This was not necessarily ill-advised, since it created a degree 
of reciprocity between the two groups on which amicable relations could be formed, something the 
Welser never attempted.172 However, as noted above, the dearth of provisions the French possessed 
on Cartier’s second voyage created an unequal trading relationship in which the natives, not the 
Europeans, dictated bartering agreements.173 It is probable that with the lack of preparedness of the 
colonial expedition that a similar situation arose between 1541 and 1543, accentuated by the 
deteriorating political relations with the natives. Archaeological evidence shows remnants of native 
food sources present at the remains of the French forts at Cap-Rouge, suggesting some trade with 
the natives did occur during the colonial attempt.174 However, this trade was clearly aimed at 
survival, not profit, emphasising the divergent motives between the French colonists and those of 
the Welser, who had better early access to provisions and could focus entirely on economic 
exploitation.  
The potential for profitable trade was not absent for the French in Canada but seems to 
have been neglected by both Cartier and Roberval. The French successes of the seventeenth century 
in North America were based on the fur trade, which became highly profitable and a vital source of 
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funding for colonial development.175 However, as Marc Lescarbot noted in his Nova Francia of 1606, 
“in the time of Jacques Cartier beavers were not cared for *whereas now+ Frenchmen come to fetch 
them.”176 Although beaver pelts were not valued by Europeans for their unique waterproof barbing 
until the seventeenth century, other animal-coats were still popular. Yet, despite an apparent 
willingness of the Stadaconans to trade in furs, the French colonists failed to turn the opportunity 
into one that could have provided crucial funds and provisions for Charlesbourg-Royale and France-
Roy.177  In this way the French case is similar to that of the Germans in Venezuela, as sustainable 
economics was overlooked in favour of exploratory missions, with trade simply used as a means for 
survival in a harsh climate. This placed a lot of faith in continuing native hospitality, which Cartier 
and the French frequently undermined, therefore ensuring that the attempts to find Saguenay and 
Asia had to be a success.  
 
Failure of Discovery Missions 
The attitude the Welser took to sustainable commerce meant their missions of discovery 
had to succeed for the colony to maintain economic viability. However, through harsh climate, poor 
leadership, native opposition and some bad luck, the entradas of the Welser governors were 
unmitigated failures.  
After his first mission of plunder and discovery had resulted in modest gold accumulation 
and the foundation of Maracaibo, Ambrose Alfinger embarked on a western expedition into the 
province of Santa Marta, which would cost him his life (See Map 2). In terms of finding gold, this was 
the most successful Welser mission. Even so, having accrued over twenty-thousand pesos of booty, 
Alfinger unwisely despatched Lieutenant Inigo de Vascuna, with only twenty-four men, to return to 
Coro with the riches and bring back fresh provisions and men so that the group could push further 
west.178 Unfortunately for Alfinger, Vascuna and his men got hopelessly lost on their return and, 
struggling through starvation and exhaustion, buried the heavy treasure under a Ceiba tree, hoping 
to return to collect it at a later date.179 All bar one man, however, succumbed to either the elements
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Nikolaus Federmann (1536-1539) 
 
Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada (1536-1539) 
 
Sebastian de Benalcazar (1537-1539) 
Map 6: Routes taken by the Conquistadores of New Granada to reach Bogota 
Source: G. Simmer, Gold und Sklaven (Berlin, 2000), Appendix 
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or native attack, even resorting to cannibalism, according to Oviedo y Banos, in an attempt to 
survive.180 The gold was never recovered and the mission of plunder and pillage that had promised a 
healthy reward only brought the death of the governor and a depletion of vital men and provisions 
for the colony, although Haebler has suggested some thirty-one thousand pesos were recovered.181 
Around the same time, as Alfinger was leading his men west, his deputy Nikolaus Federmann had 
embarked south from Coro in search of the “South Sea.” Not only did he fail in this goal but 
Federmann’s mission managed to procure only three-thousand pesos of gold near Barquisimeto, 
which would not even have covered the governor’s yearly salary.182 But the biggest failure was the 
Hohermuth expedition, which spent three horrendous years combating native attacks and a 
treacherously variable climate, for the pitiful reward of five-thousand five-hundred-and-eighteen 
pesos.183 Equipping the expedition with expensive horses and provisions would have cost several 
times that amount, and, with a survival rate of only thirty per cent, dealt a huge blow to the fortunes 
of the Welser colony.184 A similar story can be told of the final Welser expedition led by Philipp von 
Hutten, which, having gained little profit in five years searching for El Dorado between 1541 and 
1546 ended in Hutten’s murder at the hands of Juan de Carvajal.185  
The closest the Welser came to deriving great wealth from one of their missions was when 
Federmann’s unauthorised second expedition reached the province of Cundinamarca, the future 
New Granada, in 1538, at the same time as the Quesada and Benalcazar missions (See Map 6).186 
Jurisdiction was ultimately handed to Santa Marta amidst severe dispute, and New Granada yielded 
an initial 246,972 pesos to the fortunate benefactors.187 Ironically, Ambrose Alfinger had been a 
mere ten miles away from the rich centre of Cundinamarca as early as 1532 but had failed to push 
on and potentially claim all the wealth for the Welser and Venezuela.188 This was unfortunate 
considering the awful returns of the Welser governors in comparison to the massive gold output of 
New Granada, as well as the wealth acquired in other territories throughout the New World. (See 
Table 3) The Welser gamble failed to pay off. They sacrificed colonial development and a sustainable 
commercial policy in the hope of finding legendary riches and achieved little in return, ensuring the 
colony was a significant economic failure. (See Table 4) 
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Source of Wealth Jurisdiction Wealth Yielded (pesos) 
Venezuela Missions Welser Venezuela 39,917 
New Granada Conquest Santa Marta 246,976 
Mexican Mines (1533-1553) New Spain 1,355,793 
Potosi Mines (1545-1564) Peru 641,250,000 
Atahualpa Ransom Peru 3,838,508 
Table 3: Revenue derived from New World gold/silver sources 
Source: K. Haebler, Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser und ihrer Gesellschafter (Leipzig, 
1903); A.F.A. Bandelier, The Gilded Man (New York, 1893) 
 
Object of Revenue Revenue (in pesos) Notes 
Fines 333  
Slaves 7,500  
Precious Metals 6,166  
Customs Tax 2,730  
Expeditions 39,917 Highest Estimate 
Total 56,646  
 
Object of Expenditure Expenditure (in pesos) Notes 
Governor Salary 4,000  
Captain-General Salary 2,000  
Other Royal Salaries 10,400  
Credit Loans  60,000 According to the Welser in 
1540, this figure was closer to 
92,000 pesos 
Total 76,400 Could be as high as 108,400 
Table 4: Estimated Welser accounts of 1542 – Covering the period 1529-1542. Exact figures are 
wanting. 
Source: K. Haebler, Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser und ihrer Gesellschafter (Leipzig, 
1903) pp.287-8; G. Simmer, Gold und Sklaven (Berlin, 2000) pp.708-9, 730-2; J. Denzer, Die Konquista 
der Augsburger Welser-Gesellschaft in Sudamerika (Munich, 2005) p.160 
 
The pursuit of mineral wealth had always been one of Cartier’s objectives in Canada. As early 
as his first voyage Francois had hoped to find, “countries where it is said that a great abundance of 
gold and other precious things is to be found.”189 This hope was vindicated in Cartier’s eyes with the 
discovery in 1541 of the fool’s gold and iron pyrites, which the master navigator “esteemed to be 
Diamants...*and+ gold as thicke as a mans nayle”.190 However, in terms of the discovery missions 
initiated by Cartier and Roberval up the St. Lawrence, the results were as disappointing as those of 
the Welser. Not only were the two leaders prevented from continuing their pursuit of the search for 
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the Kingdom of Saguenay by impassable rapids, but they acquired little else as compensation.191 As 
mentioned, the French refrained from plundering native settlements. Whilst praiseworthy, such a 
tactic may have at least provided them with increased food provisions, if not riches. As D.B. Quinn 
has noted, “the French were the least concerned with disrupting and taking over native territory,” 
with even the seventeenth-century colonists preferring to ally with native groups against others, 
rather than conquer vast swathes of land.192 This may be because Cartier and his successors saw few 
overt signs that the Canadian natives possessed the wealth so often noted amongst the Indians of 
Mesoamerica and South America. Additionally, given that the St. Lawrence Iroquoians were semi-
sedentary, moving from “place to place” to find food193, any conquest would have yielded few 
structural benefits for French colonisation, as they would not be building on already established 
settlements. Consequently, the best-case scenario for the French was to find a rich province, similar 
to New Granada, which they could claim for the French crown and use as a base for further colonial 
development. This explains both the determination to reach Saguenay, despite a lack of proof of its 
existence, and the prolonged objective of finding a new route to the Far East. Seen in these terms, 
Cartier and Roberval failed completely, without showing the same determination and endurance the 
Welser governors had shown in traversing hundreds of miles of the Venezuelan interior, yet while 
still increasing the pressure on an already under-prepared colonial attempt.  
 
 
Communication Networks 
Communication 
The variable terrain encountered by the German governors in Venezuela on their lengthy 
entradas, and the lack of existing European knowledge of the interior of the province, made 
communication with Coro and Maracaibo a constant problem. We have seen how Ambrose 
Alfinger’s prolonged absence on his first mission, without word of him in Coro, had resulted in Georg 
Ehinger’s and Hans Seissenhofer’s attempted usurpation of command, which brought conflict with 
the appointed Spanish councillors of the settlement. Further problems were caused by the absence 
of communication in the mid-1530s when the whereabouts of neither Governor Hohermuth nor his 
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deputy Federmann was known, during a period of impoverishment in the towns of the province.194 
Dr. Navarro was sent to conduct a residencia of the Welser colony in 1538 because “it is not known if 
*Hohermuth and Federmann+ are alive or dead”.195 Unsurprisingly, the failure of the Welser 
governors to communicate their whereabouts and well-being during their interior missions created a 
power vacuum within Coro where different parties sought rule. Whilst this situation was tempered 
by the Audiencia of Santo Domingo’s appointment of Bishop Rodrigo de Bastidas as interim governor 
on three occasions – 1534, 1538 and 1540 – it eventually had dire consequences.196 The lengthy 
absence of Philipp von Hutten after 1541 resulted in the Council of the Indies sending Licentiate 
Tolosa to Coro in 1545 to “abide in justice to those complainers” who had been deprived of their 
appointed leader for so long.197 However, before Tolosa arrived in Venezuela, rogue captain Juan de 
Carvajal had finally usurped power, transplanted the population from Coro to Tocuyo, creating an 
unsanctioned settlement that culminated in the murder of Hutten and his deputy Bartholomaus 
Welser Jr. in 1546, thus effectively ending direct German rule of the colony.198 
Such power struggles might have been avoided had the governors been better able to 
communicate their location and continued survival back to the settlements during their entradas. 
Furthermore, the problems of communication occurred in the opposite direction, as the colonists 
exploring the interior failed to re-supply their expeditions because of a lack of contact with Coro. 
Philipp von Hutten wondered in a letter to a friend “how the human body could have tolerated so 
long” the “vexations” and “hardships” of the Hohermuth expedition, which remained constantly 
short of provisions.199 Even though Hohermuth had sent a number of sick men back to Coro under 
Sancho de Murga to request new supplies for his group, their inability to pinpoint the location of the 
entrada meant help never arrived and the governor and his men were forced to plunder native 
settlements, causing themselves problems for the future.200  
The link between communication networks and provisions related to the settlements as 
much as the expeditions. As noted, the Welser sent few ships to Venezuela from the Old World 
during their period of control, making it difficult to communicate the desires of the Company’s 
leaders for the colony. However, Götz Simmer has highlighted that “almost no ships” of any 
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description came to Coro during the 1530s because of its assumed lack of profitability.201 This means 
that even communication with their trading post on Hispaniola would have been difficult for the 
Welser settlers, which as we have seen, was crucial in re-supplying the colony’s basic needs.  
The French were not as hampered by communication networks within Canada, as the 
Germans were within Venezuela. Unlike the unpredictable rivers of the South American interior, the 
St. Lawrence was suitable for traversing great distances in a short time. When heading off in search 
of Saguenay, Cartier and his men covered the approximately one-hundred-and-sixty miles between 
Stadacona and the “Saults” beyond Hochelaga in a mere four days.202 It had taken Hohermuth’s 
mission over two and a half years to traverse roughly 1,864 miles south of Coro, an average of three 
miles per day, in comparison to the forty per day negotiated by Cartier on the St. Lawrence.203 
Although frozen for a few winter months each year, Cartier and Roberval had access to a navigable 
waterway in the St. Lawrence, which offered good communication between their settlements at 
Cap-Rouge and potential downstream resources.  
The real communication problem for the French was with the Old World, on which they 
were solely reliant for any additional provisions and manpower. This was a problem confronting all 
new nations bidding to establish colonies in the New World, including the Spanish. However, the 
Spaniards quick population of the Caribbean and establishment of administrative and judicial 
structures on Hispaniola meant they soon severed total reliance on the Old World.204 The French, as 
we know, could not send such vast numbers out to Canada and had no established presence in the 
New World, meaning all essential communication with their patrons required a lengthy two-way sea 
passage. In this respect the French were less fortunate than the Welser, who could at least 
theoretically relay messages to their factors in Santo Domingo, far closer in proximity than mainland 
Europe. The difficulty of communication between New World and Old undoubtedly hampered the 
French in terms of re-provisioning and recruitment and yet again highlights their lack of 
preparedness in taking so little on their colonial voyages in terms of supplies and manpower.  
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Transportation 
Linked to re-provisioning were transportation networks, which were undeveloped on 
European arrival. Vascuna’s failure to return to Coro with Alfinger’s gold in 1532, and attain the 
necessary provisions to continue the mission successfully, was due to the lack of roads and the 
failure to map or chart the course taken from Maracaibo the year before. Whilst Vascuna and his 
men got lost, the rest of the expedition returning under Pedro de San Martin the following year took 
only two weeks to make the same journey, arriving safely in Maracaibo, and highlighting the role 
both chance and personal orienteering ability played in negotiating unknown routes.205 
Nevertheless, a form of indigenous road system did exist within the province of Venezuela. Spencer 
and Raymond have shown how pre-hispanic causeways were used to link one indigenous polity to 
another, preventing the natives from having to negotiate the often flooded and marshy plains of the 
interior.206 Whilst these calzadas were not merely used for transportation, they undoubtedly “would 
have greatly facilitated the interchange of goods and information between the regional centre and 
the local elites.”207 There is, however, no mention in any of the accounts of the Welser colonists 
using these calzadas to their own advantage. Indeed, the Welser record for road-building in 
Venezuela is appalling and no effort was made to create a suitable transportation network. Friede 
has argued that there were no roads in Venezuela as of 1546, but by 1570, once under Spanish 
control, a sophisticated system existed, linking Venezuela to the surrounding provinces.208 
This failure to facilitate transportation is particularly surprising given the Welser reliance on 
the horse for carrying gold and provisions, as well as for military campaigns against the natives, who 
“were very frightened because they had never before seen horses”, according to Federmann.209 Both 
Federmann and Von Hutten highlight the difficulties confronting the horses on their expeditions, as 
they were not suited to the mountainous and flooded terrain often traversed.210 The mortality rate 
of the horses on missions was high, meaning fewer provisions could be carried to sustain the 
explorers, creating a vicious cycle in which the horses were themselves killed as a food source for the 
starving Europeans.211 Ultimately, the difficulty of transporting goods and booty via horses 
contributed to the failure of the missions that were so important to the economy of the Welser 
colony, and huge capital outlay was required to buy more horses for subsequent exploration. By 
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failing to make use of existing indigenous systems or to build their own transportation networks, the 
Welser colonists hampered the success of their interior missions and supply to their settlements. 
Whilst the St. Lawrence would have offered an adequate means of transporting goods to the 
French forts at Cap-Rouge, the lack of documentary evidence means we cannot be sure whether 
Cartier and Roberval attempted to acquire provisions from further downriver. What does appear 
clear is that the French colonists never sought to explore the interior landmass of Canada, which 
whilst it may have brought similar transportation problems to that of the Welser, could have proved 
more profitable for their settlements. Cartier noted in the account of his second voyage how the 
natives of Stadacona went to “hunt stags and other animals” and that they returned with “fresh 
meat, venison, and all varieties of fresh fish.” 212 During the seventeenth century, French settlers in 
Canada exploited these natural resources through exhaustive hunting and fishing which allowed 
them “to spend the winters without succumbing to scurvy” or starvation.213 Yet, neither the Cartier 
nor Roberval colonists appear to have attempted a similar feat, which could have proved equally 
beneficial. It is probable that Cartier’s familiarity with water-borne travel meant routes other than 
the St. Lawrence were ignored and the French became over-reliant on one transportation network.  
 
The failure of the ambitious exploratory missions that obsessed the Welser and French 
leaders, unaided by poor communication and transportation networks that they failed to rectify, 
ensured the economic viability of Venezuela and Canada became further undermined. Rather than 
pursue sustainable commerce they persisted with wild treasure-hunts despite no reasonable 
evidence of wealth, once more showing their lack of foresight in preparing for colonisation. 
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Chapter 3: Foreign Relations 
As well as their own preparedness, the Welser and French presence in the New World was 
largely dependent on foreign relations, given that few of their countrymen had yet made the 
crossing from Europe. The Spanish had for some time used the Inter Cetera papal bull to claim 
jurisdiction over all the New World territories and they did not appreciate any potential intruders. 
But it was not only relations with the Spanish that helped determine the success of the new colonial 
attempts; the role of the indigenous peoples of the Americas was of paramount importance as well. 
They offered the key to surviving hostile and alien climates for the Europeans, providing food and, 
perhaps the most important commodity, labour. However, neither the Welser nor French were able 
to maintain amicable relations with Spaniard or native.  
 
Spanish Relations 
Right of Settlement 
The Welser rights to colonise the province of Venezuela were dependent on the patronage 
of Emperor Charles V, who himself was reliant on Welser finance for his own New World ventures. 
Whilst it was a move undoubtedly not appreciated by many of his Spanish subjects, Charles’ loyalties 
were not simply to Spain. He was the Holy Roman Emperor, who commanded much of present-day 
Germany, and who rarely lived in Spain, preferring the German territories and Flanders where he 
had been educated.214 Therefore, it would be careless to suggest that all Spaniards shared his New 
World vision. Indeed, within the first few years of Welser settlement in Venezuela, the majority 
Spanish population showed clear dissent towards German rule, culminating in severe civil strife by 
1533. During his long absence on his second entrada, Ambrose Alfinger had appointed Bartolomé de 
Santillana as his deputy in Coro, who fiercely looked after Welser interests, as well as his own, in a 
dictatorial manner.215 He forbade anyone to leave the city walls, rationed food at high prices, 
hoarded water for his close cadre of supporters and imposed brutal discipline in which the settlers 
were “treated worse than Moors”.216 Santillana’s appointment by, and association with, Alfinger, 
only led to further questions over the right of Germans to rule a “Spanish territory” and resulted in 
factional dispute between Welser supporters and those of the Spanish Crown, which some historians 
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have termed a “revolution”.217 Certainly, Santillana’s subsequent arrest by the citizens of Coro, 
during the period between Alfinger’s death and Hohermuth’s appointment, saw the first serious 
revolt against the Welser leadership and undermined their position in the colony from that point 
onwards.  
Settlement disputes between the Welser and Spanish were not restricted to rights of 
governance, but also related to territory. The lack of geographical knowledge regarding the South 
American interior by 1530 meant the capitulations for the governor’s of each province set only 
northern limits to their territory.218 This encouraged settlers from neighbouring provinces to conduct 
expeditions to unknown lands and claim them as part of their own colony, unsurprisingly leading to 
conflict. As a result, the royal documents relating to the New World are littered with territorial 
disputes, many involving the Welser with the neighbouring territories of Santa Marta and Cartagena. 
By 1536, as the population of the South American colonies began to increase, Nikolaus Federmann 
complained to the Crown of the “damage the settlers and conquerors of Santa Marta” had made in 
Venezuela.219 Just two months before Federmann’s complaint, a neighbouring official had “called for 
a ban on the German people at Cabo de la Vela and not to enter the valley of Pacabuey, said to 
belong to the governorship of Santa Marta”.220 These conflicting claims made it difficult for the 
Welser to maintain amicable relations with the surrounding Spanish colonies, particularly as the 
decisions of the royal authorities tended to go against the German governorship. As seen, the pearl 
fisheries of Cabo de la Vela were transferred to Santa Martan control, despite being included as 
Venezuelan territory in Welser capitulations.221 More significant was the sole award of the 
prosperous Cundinamarca (New Granada) to Santa Marta, despite Nikolaus Federmann’s claim on 
behalf of Venezuela and his support of Jimenez de Quesada’s conquest of the inhabitant Chibcha 
Kingdom (See Map 6).222 Federmann, along with Quesada and Sebastian de Benalcazar (who had 
claimed the territory for Cartagena) had returned to Spain in 1539 to press their claims in front of 
the Council of the Indies.223 Quesada and his brother had recognised Federmann as an equal 
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conqueror of Cundinamarca in an agreement of the same year, suggesting that “his Majesty shall 
command to divide the New Kingdom to the conquistadores” and promising Federmann great 
personal rewards.224 Furthermore, several Spanish settlers questioned on the jurisdiction of New 
Granada suggested they were unsure of which province it lay closest to.225 Nevertheless, by 
December 1540, the Council of the Indies were commanding the governors of Cartagena and 
Venezuela “not to intrude into the said province of New Granada”, which had been awarded to 
Santa Marta.226  
Not only did this decision serve to undermine the Welser colony in relation to Santa Marta 
but it led to more infighting within the German company. Although Federmann had made the claim 
that New Granada was in Venezuelan territory, Oviedo suggested this was due to personal motives, 
as Federmann had long hoped to be governor of the Welser province in the future.227 However, his 
lack of communication with the Welser authorities regarding his claim, and his unilateral decision to 
return to Spain to campaign for it, increased Company suspicions about a man they had previously 
revoked the governorship from on moral grounds.228 Consequently, on his return to Europe in 
August 1540, Federmann was detained in a Flanders prison for supposedly embezzling over twenty-
thousand ducats owed to the Welser from the Cundinamarca conquest.229 However, during the 
subsequent interrogation, Federmann counter-claimed that the Welser owed two-hundred-
thousand ducats to the Spanish Crown, as a result of not paying the royal fifth on numerous 
commodities since the inception of the colony, shortly after he was barred from the governorship 
again.230 Whilst it is obvious from what we know of the colony’s finances that this was nothing but a 
vindictive lie, it permanently damaged the Welser reputation in Spain and set off a series of legal 
proceedings that would end with the revocation of their contract in 1556, despite Federmann’s 
deathbed retraction in 1542.231 
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Unlike the Welser, the French were certainly not the recipients of any patronage from 
Charles V, the long-term enemy of Francois I. Furthermore, as a staunch Catholic, Francois needed a 
way to placate the Pope from opposing his colonisation plans, which went against the Inter Cetera 
papal bull of 1493 that had divided the lands of the New World between Spain and Portugal.232 
Francois therefore hinted at the importance of evangelization in any French colony in Canada, 
testified to by his 1541 commission to Roberval.233 Whilst not sincere, this move would have made it 
harder for Pope Paul III to side with Charles V, as the French offered thousands of potential converts 
to the Catholic Church.234 This did not prevent Charles from being concerned that the French would 
use any colonial settlement in North America as a launch-pad for attacks against his own New World 
territories or his ships, laden with riches, crossing the Atlantic. 235 This fear is evident from a letter 
sent by Charles to the Cardinal of Toledo in November 1540, in which the Emperor expresses his 
anger at the French “contravention of the treaty” that had ended their previous war and emphasises 
the importance of spying on the colonial preparations so that if necessary a Spanish fleet “may be 
speedily formed...to resist and destroy them”.236 There was also, no doubt, concern amongst the 
Spanish authorities that Cartier may find a Western route to Asia through North America or find 
riches in Canada comparable to those of New Spain. A Spanish spy report of April 1541 suggests 
Cartier was heading to Canada to search for mines of precious metals and that the mariner was 
“informed by the same savages that there is a great quantity of them”.237 Such reports, and Spanish 
knowledge of French preparations, ensured the colonial attempt was to be constantly monitored 
and gave the French a vulnerable starting point in their New World endeavours.  
 
Direct Interference 
The dispute over rights of settlement was certainly one cause of increased Spanish 
interference in the Welser colony. However, perhaps more significant was the inefficient governance 
of the Germans and their deputies, particularly during the first few years after 1529, when colonial 
development was ignored in favour of exploration. The death of Alfinger and the Santillana incident 
gave the Spanish authorities in Santo Domingo a good excuse to intervene in the province, as they 
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were sent to mediate the civil strife.238 In 1534, as part of this mediation, Bishop Bastidas was 
appointed as interim governor, whilst the Welser tried to find a successor to Alfinger.239 This began a 
period of greater direct interference from Santo Domingo and Madrid in the governance of 
Venezuela, as the Welser role became less and less prominent in the administration of the colony. 
Firstly, the Spanish authorities began to appoint their own officials directly to council posts in Coro 
and Maracaibo, rather than simply approve Welser appointments.240 Secondly, they took 
responsibility for hearing civil and criminal cases for the province in Santo Domingo, even though a 
cabildo (town council) existed in Coro for such purposes.241 Furthermore, they tried to appoint 
Bastidas as permanent governor during Hohermuth’s trip to the interior in 1538, without seemingly 
consulting the Welser hierarchy.242 These moves were unsurprising given the long absences of the 
Welser governors and the neglect of their duties to colonial settlement. Nevertheless, not all 
interference in the province was aimed at removing power from the Welser. The Audiencia 
intervened to ensure royal salaries were paid on several occasions.243 Additionally, in 1535, they 
recovered four brigantines paid for by the Welser that had been recalled to Hispaniola by wary 
officials in Santa Marta.244 They even gave strict orders forbidding armed men of neighbouring 
provinces from entering Venezuela, in order to protect Welser interests.245 However, the failure of 
the Welser to show any reciprocal gesture, whilst continuing to ignore the development of the 
colony, encouraged the Spanish authorities to further erode their power.  
Their method of doing this was through the appointment of residencias, “the normal form of 
judicial inquiry into the activities of servants of the crown against whom complaints had been 
lodged”.246 The first such body was licensed under Dr. Navarro, who in May 1538 presented the 
returned Hohermuth with a series of allegations against the Welser governance of Venezuela.247 
These allegations included food hoarding, excessive discipline against the Spanish settlers, brutality 
towards the native population, and the appointment of unsuitable deputies without official 
                                                          
238
 Simmer, Gold und Sklaven, p. 232 
239
 Haebler, Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser, pp. 217-218 
240
 For example see: ‘Nombramiento de Juan de Frias como regidor de Maracaibo’ *11/12/1534] in Moll & Otte 
(eds.), Cedularios, vol. 1,  p. 200 
241
 ‘Que el gobernador y justicias de Venezuela cumplan y hagan cumplir el orden sobre las apelaciones en lo 
civil/criminal’ *12/7/1531+ Ibid, pp. 102-104 
242
 ‘Respuesta a una carta de Rodrigo de Bastidas’ [8/11/1538] in Moll & Otte (eds.), Cedularios, vol. 2, pp. 81-
84 
243
 ‘Que los oficiales de Venezuela paguen a los Welser todos los salarios atrasados’ *6/2/1535+ in Moll & Otte 
(eds.), Cedularios, vol. 1,  p. 252 
244
 ‘Que los oficiales de Venezuela devulevan a los Welser los derechos indebidamente cobrados por 4 
bergantines’ *22/1/1535+ in Ibid., p. 233 
245
 ‘Prohibición de hacer armadas a Venezuela y que salgan los intrusos’ *13/11/1534+ in Ibid., pp. 174-5 
246
 Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, p. 123   
247
 Simmer, Gold und Sklaven, p. 410 
 59  
authorisation.248 Whilst justified, Navarro insisted that the Welser family themselves take 
responsibility for their officials’ actions, as well as Governor Hohermuth.249 Although this decision 
appears slightly unfair, it is testament to the failure of the Welser and their appointed leaders to 
oversee the daily affairs of the colony.  
The second significant residencia was commissioned for Licenciate Juan de Frias in 1544. As 
Frias was also due to oversee the provinces of Margarita and Cubagua, he sent Juan de Carvajal to 
begin proceedings in Venezuela.250 As we know, Carvajal used the opportunity to usurp power from 
the Welser and murder Philipp von Hutten and Bartholomaus Welser Jr., the last two German 
representatives in the colony, in 1546, in what was a very direct act of Spanish interference. This did 
not prevent Frias from blaming the impoverished nature of the colony solely on the Welser, 
although the residencia of Licenciate Tolosa the following year at least placed some of the blame at 
the hands of the Spanish. Indeed, Tolosa recognised that there were so few permanent settlers left 
in Venezuela that they could not elaborate on the accusations levelled against the Welser.251 
Nevertheless, the years of increasing Spanish interference and inefficient German governance meant 
that from 1545 the Welser and their representatives were vigorously defending their rights to 
preserve the colony at the Council of the Indies.252 After several years of allegations and counter-
claims, the Welser were finally found guilty of having failed to fulfil the obligations of their 
capitulation and the colony was officially transferred to Spanish governorship in 1556.253  
In the French case, despite Charles V’s orders to destroy any foreign fleets heading to 
establish a New World colony, there is no indication that this ever occurred. Certainly, a Spanish 
fishermen present in Newfoundland during the short lifespan of the Canadian colony testified that 
he had seen no Spanish ships in any of the local harbours.254 Nevertheless, the clear concern of the 
Spanish, and also the Portuguese, regarding French colonial plans is evident from the documents.255 
Had the Cap-Rouge settlement lasted longer than a mere two years, the Iberians might have taken 
direct action, as the Portuguese later did in Brazil and the Spanish in Florida, both against French 
colonies.   
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The greatest direct interference, however, occurred in Europe with the start of the Fourth 
Italian War between the French and the Habsburgs and their allies in July 1542, shortly after 
Roberval’s departure for Canada.256 For a colony that was always going to be reliant on re-supply 
from the Old World, this was a disastrous event, as the few remaining funds of the French treasury 
were diverted towards the war effort. Furthermore, not only had Roberval just left for Canada, but 
Cartier was returning, arriving at Saint-Malo in September 1542 just as the French offensive 
gathered momentum and as Francois attempted to put down the “gabelle revolt” against his 
controversial salt tax.257 It would be unsurprising if the Canadian colony was the least of Francois’ 
concerns at this moment. Therefore, if Cartier had returned to France to acquire more supplies, as a 
Spanish sailor believed he had, his chances of success would have been severely undermined.258 Any 
possibility of the colony being re-provisioned after the Roberval mission was effectively nullified by 
the ongoing war, which saw peace finally agreed in 1546.259  
The French did not suffer the same level of direct Spanish interference as the Welser in the 
New World, largely because the short existence of their Canadian colony prevented Old World 
hostilities from being carried to the New, as would happen later in the century. Although the Welser 
were theoretically better supported by the Spanish in their colonial enterprise, as a result of their 
patronage from Charles V, the obvious hostility the Spanish settlers had to any other nationality 
encroaching on “their” land is clear to see. The suspicions of the Old World, during a period of 
religious dissent and stateless nations, coupled with the Welser’s poor governing performance, 
ensured that ultimately they would be removed by their Spanish overlords. The ability of the 
Spaniards to populate and develop the New World quickly during the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries made any intrusion by foreign powers, patronised or otherwise, an unlikely 
possibility during this period.   
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Native Relations 
Unlike with the Spanish, the contact between the arriving Europeans and the natives of the 
New World was an unexpected and monumental clash of cultures and belief systems that the 
majority found difficult to accept. For the Europeans, they were forced to reconcile these “beings” 
with their ancient world-view that all men were descended from Noah.260 For the natives 
themselves, they had to try and defend their freedom and cultures against armed invaders. 
Therefore, the relationship between these two groups played an important part in early New World 
colonies, as each group tried to use the other for their own survival and benefit. The Spanish created 
a network of laws to protect the natives in theory261; yet in reality, they undermined them through 
false claims of civilisation and evangelisation, incorporating the natives into encomienda systems, 
whereby they were forced to offer tribute and labour to the colonists.262 Whilst an often brutal and 
fatal ploy against the natives, it allowed the Spaniards to maintain a regular supply of labour in most 
of their colonies. However, neither the Welser nor French colonists could enact a suitable native 
policy. Despite a heavy reliance on their production capabilities, the Europeans failed to control the 
indigenous inhabitants in their territories and ultimately alienated them from compliant help.  
 
Reliance on the Natives 
The first Welser colonists arrived in Coro to a peaceful native population of Caquetio-
Indians, which had been befriended by Juan de Ampies during his time in the province.263 Although 
some remained sceptical of European peoples as a result of the slave-raids that had persisted on the 
Venezuelan coast in the first three decades of the century, they remained hospitable.264 The 
Caquetio had lived on the northern coast of Venezuela for several centuries and had adapted to the 
dry, barren land surrounding Coro by creating irrigation methods, which enabled stable food 
                                                          
260
 See: M. Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Philadelphia, 1964) pp. 
207-253 
261
 The Laws of Burgos of December 1512 recognised that the American natives were free subjects of the 
Spanish crown, yet needed European guidance for their own benefit. The Laws decreed they should spend 
nine months a year in Spanish service, in which time they could learn to properly govern themselves. This 
helped facilitate the encomienda system. Furthermore, in the following year, 1513, the controversial 
“Requirement” was drawn up. It was supposed to be read to native populations before Spanish attacks, giving 
them the chance to surrender freely to the Spanish Crown before conquest. Unsurprisingly, given language 
differences, the “Requirement” was abused by the Spaniards, who used it as legal justification for conquest. L. 
Hanke (ed.), History of Latin American Civilization: sources and interpretations (2
nd
 ed.) (Boston, 1973) pp. 93-
96  
262
 See: L.N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492-1700 (Minneapolis, 1984) p. 157  
263
 Denzer, Die Konquista der Augsburger Welser-Gesellschaft, pp. 69-70 
264
 Bandelier, The Gilded Man, p. 8 
 62  
production.265  As we know, the Welser sent few provisions for much of their tenure, with hardly any 
ships arriving from either Europe or Santo Domingo, and settlers unwilling to work the land. As a 
result, their reliance on the native Caquetio for food was extremely high and a law to protect them 
was introduced in 1530.266 The rejection of Ambrose Alfinger’s appeal against this ordinance by the 
Audiencia in Santo Domingo suggests a degree of sincerity in the protection of the natives.267 
However, the Venezuelan inhabitants were not just important to the settlements of Coro 
and Maracaibo but also to the discovery expeditions undertaken. Firstly, they were essential as 
porters of European provisions and weaponry through the harsh terrain of the interior. This is 
evident from Philipp von Hutten’s account, as the Europeans were forced to put “two caciques in 
chains” so they would “give us Indians to carry our goods”.268 Secondly, the Europeans relied on food 
supplied by native groups they encountered, either being given it or taking it by force. Oviedo 
exclaimed that the Europeans resorted to “eating roots and fruit from trees” when they traversed 
through uninhabited areas.269 Additionally, Nikolaus Federmann’s relief is evident in the account of 
his first exploration when his men, suffering “abundant hunger”, saw “rising smoke from the 
surrounding mountains”, which suggested native pueblos and a potential food source.270 Thirdly, the 
explorers required native peoples to act as interpreters for them as they encountered unfamiliar 
tribes further inside the continent. They were important in trying to cement good relations between 
the Europeans and various tribal groups and, if necessary, asking for food and directions to wealthy 
lands. The importance of amiable native-European relations in the Welser colony is obvious, as their 
whole settlement and economic base relied on native manpower and ingenuity. It is clear to see how 
a failure to preserve good relations could jeopardise the colony as a whole. 
Whilst it is certain that the Caquetio had encountered Europeans before the Welser arrival, 
it is not clear whether the St. Lawrence Iroquoians of Canada had done so before Cartier’s visit in 
1534. The Micmac of the Gulf of St. Lawrence would have been familiar with European fishermen 
since the beginning of the century and had engaged in fruitful barter for metal goods.271 Dickason 
has postulated that the Iroquoians of Stadacona also spent their summer months in the Gulf fishing, 
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which meant they too would have had experience of European contact.272 This is important, as it 
would have allowed the Iroquoians to understand the particularities of barter with the Europeans, 
what they prized in particular, and how to get a good deal for themselves. These factors would play 
out on all of Cartier’s voyages, including the colonial attempt. The Stadaconans had in abundance 
one thing the Europeans did not: nutritious food. In 1606 Marc Lescarbot noted that “they of Canada 
and Hochelaga” tilled with such efficiency that “the land did afford them corn, beans, peas, millions, 
pompions and cucumbers”, most of which could be stored.273 By his second voyage, which involved 
nearly a year’s stay near Stadacona, Cartier had become reliant on these and other native food 
sources to feed his men274, which involved trading his own wares.275 Unlike newly-encountered 
native groups, which offered food as a sign of hospitality, the Stadaconan’s experience of European 
trading enabled them to exact a higher price. There is no reason to believe this pattern did not 
continue during the colonial expedition and, indeed, archaeological evidence at the French fort 
shows signs of commercial exchange. The fact that the French had no prior knowledge of how to 
survive the Canadian climate meant they could not afford to dismiss the natives entirely. Even at a 
point of fractured relations during the winter of 1535-6, the natives presented Cartier with the cure 
for scurvy after fifty of his men had died of “marvellous and extraordinary symptoms”.276 The 
procedure to make a drink rich in Vitamin C from the bark of the white cedar may have been simple; 
yet it was alien to the French, who without the cure would have suffered further casualties through 
that winter or during that experienced several years later by Cartier.277 As with the Welser colonists, 
the French required the natives of Canada as guides, leading them up the St. Lawrence they knew so 
well. However, as was the case with the Welser, the alienation of the natives would make them less 
inclined to serve the European colonial purpose. 
 
Alienation of Natives 
Despite the obvious benefits of collaborating with the natives of Venezuela, the Welser 
colonists carried out widespread abuse and plunder of the indigenous populace. This was not a rarity 
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amongst settlers in the New World. However, the Welser failure to conduct a systematic 
exploitation of the natives, as was common in the Spanish colonies, ensured their random targeting 
had only negative consequences. After a few years of seemingly peaceful cooperation between the 
few Europeans in Coro and the local Caquetios, Bartolome de Santillana’s brutal regime as Alfinger’s 
deputy, in which the natives were tortured, robbed and enslaved, caused an exodus of Cacique 
Manaure and his people into the interior by the end of 1532.278 Simultaneously, Alfinger was 
plundering his way west from Maracaibo, pillaging native settlements and enslaving any captives.279 
His actions unsurprisingly terrified the natives he encountered, pushing them further into the 
hinterland, and earning Alfinger the epithet of “the cruel of the cruels” amongst the Spanish 
chroniclers.280 Alfinger enslaved the natives on a large scale, despite the ordinances against it, and 
despite the fact that he had brought a number of black slaves with him to the province in 1529.281 
Indeed, a cedula of 1534 suggests the Welser had been allowed four-thousand black slaves in the 
colony, ostensibly “to extract gold from the mines”, and were being granted a further eight-hundred 
for similar purposes.282 However, Friede has argued that it is likely that Alfinger sold the majority of 
these slaves to other New World provinces, as they fetched a higher price than the weaker 
Amerindians did.283 Slave-trading was the one commercial success of the Welser colony and was 
conducted by the majority of Coro’s residents, including the clergy284, even though the Company 
itself may not have authorised it.285 
All this plunder and enslavement simply served to diminish the labour potential of the 
colony. In 1536 the Council of the Indies responded angrily to the depopulation of the north coast of 
Venezuela, brought about by the “damage *and+ displacement” caused by Nikolaus Federmann.286 By 
1539 they were insisting that the “three or four thousand Indians” left around Coro be treated “as 
free people”, in order to maintain some indigenous workforce.287 In reality, the population decline of 
the natives had begun with the arrival of the Welser, as they were enslaved, killed or fled inland. 
Bartolomé de las Casas’ estimation that the German governors enslaved one-million and killed four 
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to five-million natives may be a ridiculous over-exaggeration; yet they undoubtedly helped deplete 
their numbers.288 Additionally, the failure of the Welser governors to implement the effective 
encomienda system, that served the Spanish so well, created further problems. It led to reprimands 
from royal authorities, who were ostensibly concerned for native welfare, as well as that of their 
impoverished countrymen.289 Furthermore, it created resentment from the colonists who were 
denied a means of both economic and social advancement, which might have helped alleviate their 
debt.290 It also enabled the natives to flee more easily, further depriving the province of potential 
labourers. Considering the Caquetio were a semi-sedentary group, which did not possess the well-
established and complex administrative structures of the Aztec and Inca states, the Welser officials 
could not use existing indigenous labour systems as the Spaniards did in Mexico and Peru. 
Consequently, their ignorance of the encomienda system overlooked a European solution to co-
opting native work groups.  In an under-populated, poorly-provisioned province, which relied on 
native food production, this dearth of labour seriously jeopardised the sustainability of the colony 
and put more pressure on the entradas. 
The treatment of the natives on the Welser expeditions was no better than in the main 
settlements. As slaving continued on the coast, periodic raids took place on the entradas in the hope 
of securing porters or potential commodities for their return to Coro. Von Hutten relates countless 
times of Hohermuth sending out lieutenants Martin, Velasco and Cardenas to capture Indians whilst 
on the mission, “all volatile and shared amongst the Christians”.291 This only led the native tribes to 
flee into the mountains of the Eastern Andes or the highlands of the south, which were harder to 
penetrate. Furthermore, Von Hutten explains how the natives “burned and devastated” their own 
food stores and maize fields before fleeing, to halt the march of the Europeans who they knew were 
reliant on them for nourishment.292 When the Europeans did encounter native groups that were less 
than compliant, their response was typically a massacre, or the capture of the tribal chief for 
ransom. Neither Federmann nor Von Hutten saw a problem with this tactic. As noted above, 
Federmann shows no concern in his account for ambushing and killing “tribal people *who+ eat 
                                                          
288
 B. de las Casas, A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, trans. N. Griffin (Harmondsworth, 1992)  
pp. 97-101 
289
 ‘Que el gobernador de Venezuela reparta los indios de la provincia’ *11/12/1534+ in Moll & Otte (eds.), 
Cedularios, vol. 1, pp. 194-5  
290
 ‘Que el doctor Navarro deshaga todo lo que haya dispuesto en Venezuela’ [26/2/1538]  in Moll & Otte 
(eds.), Cedularios, vol. 2, pp. 63-4  
291 ‘"Newe Zeytung”’ in P. Von Hutten, Schmitt & F.K. Von Hutten, Das Gold der Neuen Welt, p. 65. (Original: 
“alles flüchtig und friedbruchig, unter die Christen geteilt.“) 
292
 Ibid., p. 72 
 66  
human flesh and massacre and slaughter their enemies”.293 Von Hutten, similarly, appeared to have 
no moral qualms about overrunning what he saw as “a bare, naked, bestial people”.294 The Welser 
leaders were men of their times, who viewed the American natives as an underclass or separate 
race.295 This had not prevented the Spanish in other colonies from using native alliances for their 
own benefit, as witnessed by the Aztec conquest, when the Spaniards joined forces with the 
Tlaxcalans. However, the indiscriminate nature of the Welser plundering allowed disparate tribes to 
unite against a common enemy they had previously never shared.296 The numerous native groups of 
the Venezuelan interior (See Table 5), with their own cultural idiosyncrasies and power alliances, 
appear to have been unacknowledged by the Welser explorers, who made no distinction between 
each tribe. This is partly understandable given the problem of communication between European 
Governor Native Group 
Alfinger Pacabueyes 
 Bubures 
 Onotos 
 Buredes 
 Coanaos 
 Guiriguanas 
 Aruacañas 
 Zamiruas 
 Pauxoto 
 Haraacañas 
 Thamara 
 Zondagaus 
 Zompachay 
 Xiriguanas 
 Paraguana 
 Aruagas 
Hohermuth Pemenos 
 Cuybas 
 Cuyones 
 Caquetio 
 Mazopides 
 Guaipies 
 Chogues 
Table 5: Natives Encountered by Alfinger and Hohermuth as Mentioned in Oviedo’s Historia 
Source: F.G. Oviedo y Valdes, Historia General y Natural de las Indias (Volume 3) (Madrid, 1959)  
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and native. Federmann had attempted to overcome this barrier by accruing an interpreter from each 
district he passed through, with a resulting language relay back to Spanish. However, “of every ten 
words I spoke, scarcely one would arrive exactly as I desired”, bemoaned the lieutenant-general.297  
Language barriers made communicating with different tribes extremely difficult, particularly 
when their trust in the Europeans was low, therefore hindering exploration. The natives played on 
this by (falsely) informing the Europeans of where to go to obtain the riches they so obviously 
desired. As early as Alfinger’s devastations on the north coast, the natives had notified him of the 
great riches of the south, no doubt in an attempt to rid themselves of the abusive governor.298 These 
rumours persisted throughout the course of the Welser explorations, as the natives sought to lure 
the greedy invaders to their destruction at a false “El Dorado”. Von Hutten noted how a native tribe 
informed Hohermuth and his men of a land of gold and silver that came “from the other side of the 
mountain”, which proved impassable.299 Further on, another native chief pointed Hohermuth in the 
direction of a “rich province...20 or 30 days travel from here”,300 when it was likely he was simply 
guiding the Europeans to the district of the fierce Choque people, who forced them to retreat.301 
Whilst this setback did not end Welser hopes of discovering a rich territory of their own, it led to the 
failure of the Hohermuth expedition, and all the ramifications that brought, and encouraged Philipp 
von Hutten’s disastrous mission of 1541-6 to find the golden land, which he had read into the 
natives’ stories.302 
The failure of the Welser to recognise tribal differences in culture and political allegiance, 
coupled with their incessant abuse of the natives both in the settlements and the interior, despite 
their overriding reliance on their assistance, ensured they could sustain neither an entrada nor, by 
extension, a colony. 
The French made similar mistakes to the Welser colonists with regards to their native policy, 
which originated on Jacques Cartier’s first voyage in 1534, when he kidnapped Taignoagny and 
Domagaya, sons of Stadaconan chief Donnacona, and took them back to France in the hope they 
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could be trained as interpreters.303 After some promising early signs of peaceful exchange, this was a 
grave insult to the native populace. Furthermore, before he left, Cartier ordered the erection of a 
stone cross inscribed with “LONG LIVE THE KING OF FRANCE”, which angered the natives who saw it 
as a territorial claim, despite Cartier’s declaration that it was a mere “guidepost”.304 These early 
actions established native mistrust towards the French and would hamper their future exploration 
and settlement attempts. As with other Europeans, such as Von Hutten and Federmann, Cartier had 
preconceived notions of the “wild and savage folk” he encountered, which led him to mistrust the 
St. Lawrence Iroquoians from the outset.305 On his second voyage, Domagaya and Taignoagny’s 
resentment at having been taken to France was evident, as they became “altogether changed in 
their attitude and goodwill”.306 As the two sons had been trained as interpreters for the French, they 
were in a position of power to negotiate between Cartier and their kin, and were also responsible for 
initiating the rumours of Saguenay. 
The Saguenay myth would further alienate the French from the Iroquoians, as well as divert 
precious resources from the colony in 1541 and 1543. It is probable that Domagaya and Taignoagny 
concocted the story of a rich land to the west of Stadacona as a means of assuring their return to 
Canada on the second French voyage.307 What is surprising is that, like the Welser with the story of 
the “Meta” and “El Dorado”, the French accepted these rumours as fact, despite their normal 
mistrust of the natives. Cartier’s conviction that he knew the location of the “kingdom and province 
of the Saguenay” is astounding, given his lack of factual evidence.308 The people of Hochelaga 
embellished the story of riches by encouraging Cartier that a wealthy land was not much further 
west, in what again looks a typical ploy of the natives to rid themselves of European presence.309 
Cartier’s own description of the Hochelaga region, “as fine a land and as level as ever one beheld”, 
confirms his excitement at the native fabrications and his belief that he was nearing his goal.310 
Such fanciful delusions only led Cartier and the French to ignore the practicalities of 
surviving in such a harsh climate as Canada, in which native support was essential. His trip to 
Hochelaga on his second voyage was in itself hugely damaging to French relations with the 
neighbouring Stadaconans. Acquiring European goods was of great prestige and practical use for the 
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natives of Canada, who had little early foreign contact, and the Stadaconans wanted to ensure they 
retained this privilege ahead of the Hochelagans.311 Considering that Stadacona was probably a 
vassal to Hochelaga, Donnacona’s determination to maintain sole access to French trade is 
unsurprising, as it could have changed the political fortunes of his people.312 Cartier’s ignorance of 
inter-native relations and breach of the upriver traffic trade privilege, driven by his lust for wealth, 
deprived the French of potentially invaluable allies for their future colonial settlement.313 Having 
returned from Hochelaga, the French wasted their final chance to cement an alliance with the 
Stadaconans by refusing to help Donnacona defeat a potential usurper of his position, named 
Agona.314 Cartier’s misinterpretation or general lack of concern for native power structures along the 
St. Lawrence proved costly. His clear annoyance with Donnacona for not completely deferring to 
French demands led him to paranoid concerns that the Stadaconans would attack the French.315 
Donnacona’s rivals accentuated these fears by informing the French of his habitual treachery, 
probably in an effort to improve their own standing with the Europeans.316 Nevertheless, Cartier’s 
actions on his second voyage alienated the vital Stadaconans, who were still supplying the French 
with food and cures for scurvy. Before his departure in May 1536, Cartier compounded matters by 
placing a more brazen territorial cross and issuing “orders for the seizure of Donnacona, Taignoagny, 
Dom Agaya, and two other headmen”, no doubt in the hope that they would give more authority to 
the Saguenay story at the French court. 317 This antagonistic native policy ensured the survival of any 
future colony was in jeopardy before it started.  
Donnacona’s removal to France simply led to more thrilling tales at court of the Kingdom of 
Saguenay, which became ever more fanciful, yet appealing, to the French.318 He spoke of “mines of 
gold and silver in great abundance”, a plethora of exotic spices, and even “men who fly”, which 
Francois readily believed.319 However, by the time of the colonial expedition, Donnacona and the 
majority of the natives taken back to Europe had died, despite Cartier’s promise that they would 
return.320 Although Donnacona’s removal had enabled Agona to take charge of the Stadaconans, and 
he gave a great welcome to Cartier in 1541, the outward joy shown merely masked hostility and 
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disappointment.321 The previous years of undermining and mistreating the natives had come back to 
haunt the French, and their defensive fort location, ten miles upriver from Stadacona, seems to 
suggest they realised this (See Figure 1).322 On returning to Charlesbourg-Royale in 1541, having 
 
failed to find Saguenay, the French found that the natives had stopped bringing them the food they 
so desperately required.323 Although the narrative of the colony breaks off at this point, subsequent 
reports from fishermen suggest the natives became even more hostile. Cartier related to Roberval 
how the natives “went about dayly to annoy him”, whilst Spanish sailors suggested that several 
French carpenters had been murdered and that “they killed more than thirty-five of Jacque’s 
men”.324 The native realisation that nothing good would come from Cartier and his countrymen is a 
likely explanation for these supposed attacks, which the weakened French would have found 
difficult to withstand. 
Although the account of the Roberval mission suggests some trade continued between the 
French and natives, it is unlikely the latter gave as much support as they had first done with 
Cartier.325 Furthermore, whilst the accounts imply that the French did not physically abuse the 
Iroquoian natives, as the Welser had the inhabitants of Venezuela, we cannot be sure. Andrea Frisch 
has shown how the early accounts of the French in the New World were in the form of “official 
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reports... more in common with a legal document than with a work of historiography”.326 
Consequently, both Cartier and the Roberval account may have omitted certain details they would 
not have wanted Francois to see, such as the abuse of the native populace. Certainly, the viewpoint 
of Roberval as an “inflexible and autocratic man”327 is commensurate with his harsh discipline of his 
own men, whom he ruled with an iron fist.328 Such harshness may have been applied to the natives 
as well. Andre Thevet suggested in his Singularitez that some young soldiers under Roberval “dyd cut 
of bothe Armes and Legs of some of these poor people, bicause that they would proue whether their 
swords woulde cut well or no”.329 Therefore, whilst not an obvious cause of alienation, physical harm 
must be considered concurrently with Cartier’s earlier native policy. Furthermore, like the Welser, 
the French appeared to encounter severe communication problems that led to misinterpretation 
and disagreement, as well as failing to understand the ethnic and cultural differences of the tribes 
they met. Whilst not beyond doubt, it is likely that the Stadaconans and Hochelagans belonged to 
different ethnic groups, whose cultural differences may have been overlooked by the French, as the 
Welser had done in Venezuela, making it harder to maintain consistent relations with different 
tribes.330 
The Welser and French colonies relied heavily on some native collaboration, yet their 
governors and colonists failed to appreciate their indebtedness to a “savage” race. This undermined 
the foundations of both colonies from the beginning as it tied in with false rumours of wealth, 
provisions and food resources that were so precious, and in the Welser case, relations with the 
Spanish. With a more flexible and better controlled native policy, both colonies would have stood a 
better chance of survival.   
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Conclusion 
By comparing two very different enterprises we can establish some of the key determinants 
for colonial failure in the New World. The French expedition to Canada was commissioned by the 
Crown and conducted for the nation, as France sought to counter the increasing power garnered by 
Spain from her New World territories. Meanwhile, the German-governed Welser colony was a multi-
national attempt to settle Venezuela, which tried to balance the commercial ambitions of the 
Augsburg merchants with the imperial desires of their patron, Charles V. Furthermore, the Welser 
colony lasted some fourteen times longer than its French counterpart. Despite such contrasting 
time-spans and compositions, the similarity in the causes for failure between the two is quite 
illuminating.  
One of the most obvious factors underpinning the failure of both colonies was the lack of 
preparedness of the backers and settlers for creating a sustainable New World settlement. Neither 
colony possessed the necessary manpower or resources for a continued period to be able to create a 
stable base for colonisation. In the Welser case, this was largely due to the few ships sent by the 
Company from the Old World or Santo Domingo during the colony’s existence. Furthermore, the 
appeal of Venezuela was in stark contrast to that of other New World territories, where Spanish rule 
and known riches were far more enticing than the German-governance and speculative exploration 
of the Welser colony. For the French, their lack of preparedness in large part stemmed from poor 
funding. Francois I’s ruined treasury, recovering from years of intermittent warfare with the 
Habsburgs, was seemingly incapable of providing finance for the necessary provisions. As with 
Venezuela, Canada lacked the appeal necessary to uproot French citizens still unfamiliar with the 
New World, forcing the recruitment of unreliable convicts. It would take the religious wars and social 
strife of the second half of the century for the French population to consider emigration en masse, 
enabling more suitable colonial recruitment during Champlain’s time.  
With such an impoverished base for settlement, the leaders and settlers of both colonies 
attempted to find a quick economic solution to their problem through exploration. Whatever their 
patrons’ original motives may have been, the Welser and French emigrants were similarly driven by 
false geographical belief, which encouraged them to advance despite no obvious evidence of what 
they sought. The Welser credit system meant the colonists were indebted from the outset, forcing 
them into questionable entradas in search of the mythical “South Sea”, the riches of the “Meta”, 
and, most infamously, “El Dorado”. With very little sound reasoning, the Welser governors all 
conducted lengthy, and ultimately futile, discovery missions throughout Venezuela and its 
neighbouring provinces. They yielded very little reward, therefore failing to alleviate the burden of 
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the settlers of Coro and Maracaibo, whilst diverting precious resources and manpower away from 
these colonial centres, which remained mere mud villages. Whilst the French explorations were not 
comparable to those of the Welser, Cartier was also responsible for siphoning provisions and men 
from his fortification at Charlesbourg-Royale, within weeks of arrival in 1541. Continuing his long-
held ambition of finding a western route to Asia, Cartier neglected the development of his new 
colony, which already lay on weak foundations. His returns were as poor as those of the Welser, and 
Roberval’s exploration attempt two years later surrendered little more. Such pursuits suggest that 
the Welser and French colonists were more interested in gaining easy access to sources of wealth, 
with a mindset geared towards exploration, rather than the colonial pursuits necessary to create a 
long-term New World settlement.     
It is significant that an exploratory desire is particularly evident in the leaders of both 
colonies. The Welser governors, as well as Cartier and Roberval, were given strong mandates for 
rule, since Germany and France were without established administrative and judicial bodies in the 
New World. Therefore, their willingness to fulfil the aims of the desperate colonists by searching for 
riches, as opposed to ordering sustainable development, helped shape the outcomes of the colonies. 
They constantly diverted men and resources away from their settlements whilst their lengthy 
absences (particularly in the Welser case) deprived their colonies of appointed leadership, creating 
power vacuums that bred discontent and factionalism. Even individual attitudes towards the natives 
were crucial, and the leaders set the standards for the treatment of their hosts, causing themselves 
further problems in the process. 
Indeed, the encouragement to pursue legendary wealth was strengthened by the stories of 
the native populations of Venezuela and the St. Lawrence, who sought to move the European 
invaders away from their lands and societies. With such an unstable food base, and lack of 
knowledge of how to survive in their respective territories, the Welser and French were immediately 
reliant on native aid. As well as providing food and labour, they were invaluable as guides, 
interpreters and, on the Welser entradas, as porters. Despite such an obvious reliance on the 
natives, acknowledged by the few first-hand accounts of the enterprises, the Welser and French 
alienated and abused their indigenous hosts beyond the point of compliance. The Welser approach 
was far more brutal than the French, typified by the plunder, enslavement and murder wrought by 
Ambrose Alfinger on the north coast during the first few years of the colony. Such mistreatment of a 
previously friendly population ensured the Welser lost their only effective labour force, as well as 
creating countless problems for their discovery missions, on which the economic future of the 
colony relied. Whilst it appears that the French did not inflict the same barbarous abuse on the 
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natives as the Welser colonists, they still undermined relations with the St. Lawrence Iroquoians 
from first contact. Failing to understand the complexities of inter-native relations, Cartier ignored 
the wishes of the Stadaconans, who were invaluable to French survival at Cap-Rouge. Furthermore, 
his snatching of Donnacona and other prominent members of their society created a degree of 
mistrust that eventually turned to hostility. With the French reliant on a return trip to the Old World 
for re-supply of European goods, an alliance with the natives would have made sense. However, as 
was the case throughout the New World, the French and Welser colonists refused to operate on 
equal terms with what they deemed “savages”, and their failure to exploit them in the systematic 
fashion the Spaniards did deprived their under-manned colonies of assistance. 
The neglect of their colony, brought about by continuous exploration and the lack of a stable 
population, saw the Welser authorities challenged by the Spanish officials of Santo Domingo and 
Madrid, who after 1534 took an increasingly interventionist role in Venezuela. Their concern for the 
economic viability of the colony, as well as the well-being of the Spanish colonists, understandably 
led them to interfere in affairs that the Welser were theoretically responsible for. Whilst this 
gradually led to the decline of the Welser colony, aided by the murder of Philipp von Hutten at the 
hands of Carvajal, the Spanish cannot be blamed for taking control of a province the Welser 
governors administered inefficiently. Without the patronage of Charles V, Venezuela might have 
been removed from Welser control a long time before 1556. The French, meanwhile, were not 
subjected to over-lordship by the Spaniards, who were their natural enemies during the period. 
Nevertheless, the Spanish concern regarding French intrusion into what they saw as their jurisdiction 
placed doubt on the colony from the outset. Furthermore, the Italian Wars in Europe had a direct 
impact on the Canadian colony, as the outbreak of conflict in 1542 effectively ended any hope of re-
supplying the colony with men or provisions, with all attention diverted to the Habsburgs.  
The two cases highlight three overriding causes that created colonial failure in the New 
World during the sixteenth century for a number of non-Spanish enterprises. Whilst the lust for 
riches would play a less decisive role in colonial failure after 1550 in comparison to religious conflict, 
which became more prevalent after the Council of Trent, the majority of the problems identified in 
this comparison proved undermining factors in other unsuccessful New World colonies. The Welser 
and French colonies both had the potential for success, had preparations been better and if the 
colonists were more willing to forgo a predominantly exploratory approach. However, their poor 
foresight and lack of adaptability ensured they could not overcome their initial problems and 
contributed to the downfall of their settlements. For the French in Canada, Samuel de Champlain 
and his successors would learn from the mistakes of Cartier and Roberval to create a thriving “New 
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France” in North America in the seventeenth century. As for the Welser, the Venezuela enterprise 
proved the difficulty of creating a profitable colony without royal backing. Indeed, the Company as a 
whole would be defunct within sixty years, suffering greatly from its Venezuelan losses. German 
involvement in the colonisation of the New World would be left to financiers and individual settlers, 
rather than active attempts at colonial governance.  
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Appendix 1 - Historical Background of Colonies 
Political Background 
Established in 1246, the Welser, of the free imperial city of Augsburg in Southern Germany, 
was a well-established trading company by the sixteenth century, with ventures ranging from 
involvement in the trade of luxuries from the Far East to domestic mining projects.1 As such, they 
had accumulated a significant amount of capital wealth that enabled them to earn political 
patronage. The patronage they gained was the ultimate prize, that of Charles V, King of Spain from 
1516 and Holy Roman Emperor from 1519. Indeed, Charles was reliant on the cash of merchants like 
the Welser in Germany and the Fornari in Italy to fund his campaign against Francois I for election to 
the Emperorship. Between them the Welser and Italian merchants raised 308, 333 florins, which 
ensured Charles was well-placed to buy the support of the various regional princes within the Holy 
Roman Empire. 2 This financial support allowed the Welser influence within Charles’ court, 
particularly as the Emperor continued to rely on merchant finance to pay for the establishment of 
his colonial empire in the New World. The Welser family themselves turned their attention towards 
the New World in the 1520s, realising the commercial opportunities that participation there could 
provide.3 They established an office in Hispaniola in 1526 for their trading agents, at the same time 
that they were negotiating rights from Charles V to “explore and exploit” the territory of Venezuela.4  
Without the political influence they had garnered with Charles through their financial support, the 
Welser would never have been able to involve themselves in the exploitation of the New World, and 
they would come to rely on this political patronage throughout their governorship in Venezuela. A 
further benefit of founding a colony within overall Spanish jurisdiction was that the Welser could 
exploit the already well-established administrative structure the Iberians had enforced to ensure 
cohesion between the New World and the Old. The Royal Audiencia (Royal Court) of Santo Domingo, 
established in 1511, held judicial and bureaucratic control over Charles’ American territories, 
reporting to the Council of the Indies in Madrid (the ultimate authority) about any problems 
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occurring in individual colonies. This allowed the Council to authorise solutions to various 
administrative problems in the New World, which theoretically benefited the colony in question.5  
The political background of the French colony in Canada is similar to that of the Welser in 
that Charles V is again a central element. French King Francois I had been at war with Charles 
intermittently since the beginning of his reign in 1515, continuing the Italian Wars initiated by 
Charles VIII in 1494.6 These successions of conflicts were typically followed by uneasy truces, 
ensuring Francois’ mind (not to mention his purse) was occupied by little else during much of his 
reign and therefore providing few decent opportunities for colonial expeditions. When Jacques 
Cartier returned from his second voyage to Canada in 1536, Francois and Charles were at war again7, 
preventing any immediate colonisation attempt, with resources and attention diverted. The conflict 
ended with the Treaty of Nice in 1538, but on the understanding that Francois would refrain from 
any more activity in the New World, which Charles perceived as his own.8 Indeed, this question of 
jurisdiction over the New World was an ongoing obstacle for French attempts at colonisation, as 
Charles V and the Spanish continually invoked the Inter Cetera papal bull of 1493 and Treaty of 
Tordesillas of 1494 as proof that France had no right to settle there.9 The French colonisation 
attempt in Canada cannot be viewed without recourse to the political situation in Europe at the 
time, with Francois’ fierce rivalry with Charles casting a shadow over all aspects of French foreign 
policy. 
 
Economic Background   
The economic background is very much interlinked with the political, particularly in the case 
of the Welser. It was their financial prowess and trading contacts that had enabled them to accrue 
the cash surplus, which ultimately bought political influence from Charles V. In theory, their 
economic strength would allow them to develop the colony in Venezuela along the lines wished for 
by themselves and their imperial overlords. However, it must be remembered that the Welser were 
primarily merchants driven by quick profit, not patrons of exploration like Francois or Charles. 
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Consequently, any money they invested they expected immediate returns on and the Venezuelan 
colony was no different. Resources for the colony were credited to the settlers themselves, who 
therefore became immediately indebted to the Welser governorship.10 This created urgency for the 
colony to make profit and helps explain many of the settlers’ actions, as well as their attitude 
towards the Welser, which posed problems for the enterprise. Whilst the Welser Company had the 
means to fund a serious colonisation attempt through traditional sources, as well as their newly 
established agencies in Seville and Santo Domingo, their strict economic policy ensured the 
Venezuela settlement would not have the provisions that were perhaps expected.  
The French, on the other hand, struggled to finance the expedition to Canada despite 
Francois I’s patronage. The Italian Wars had taken a heavy toll on the royal budget by the 1530s, 
with the employment of expensive mercenaries taking military salaries well above a manageable 
level.11 Meanwhile, domestic merchants and bankers were suffering at the hands of their Spanish, 
German and Italian rivals who had already began to profit from the New World gold and silver 
exports flooding into Seville.12 As a result, there was little chance of domestic investment for 
speculative colonial expeditions and the wealthy Italian bankers of Lyons had no interest in 
bankrolling an almost penniless French state.13 Nevertheless, the reports of wealth brought back by 
Cartier from his previous voyages to Canada, furnished by the elaborate stories of the rich Kingdom 
of Saguenay provided by captured native chief Donnacona, encouraged Francois to back the colonial 
project with what he could.14 The potential to cut his trade deficit with, and reliance on, Muslim 
middle-men from the East, as well as possibly acquiring the gold necessary to destroy Charles V’s 
ambitions in Italy once and for all, were too much of a prize for Francois to pass up.15 He may still 
even have harboured hopes of Cartier discovering a western route to Asia through Canada, despite 
his lack of success in this goal so far, as well as the failure of Giovanni Verrazano, who Francois had 
sent in 1524.16 Significantly, the precarious political and economic situation of Francois and the 
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French crown in 1540 meant that, like the Welser colony in Venezuela, quick success was required, 
and this sense of urgency may indeed have proved fatal to French colonial ambitions in Canada. 
 
Appendix 2 - Biographies 
Welser Colony 
Juan de Ampies: the founder of the settlement of Coro in 1527, Juan de Ampies had been sent to 
Venezuela by the Audiencia of Santo Domingo to halt the illicit slave-raiding taking place on the 
coast. He established positive relations with the local Caquetio Cacique, Manaure, which ensured 
the Welser were welcomed by the natives on their arrival.  
Rodrigo de Bastidas: The son of the conquistador of the same name, Rodrigo de Bastidas was 
appointed the first Bishop of Coro in the early 1530s. He would later become Interim Governor of 
the Welser colony on three occasions. In 1534 he took charge of the province whilst the Welser 
sought a replacement for Ambrose Alfinger. In 1538 he was sent back to Venezuela because of 
concerns over the well-being of Governor Hohermuth, who had been in the interior for three years. 
Finally, in 1540 he became temporary governor a final time because of Hohermuth’s death. He 
played an important transitional role between Welser governorships and was a key source of 
information on Venezuela for the Spanish royal authorities.  
Juan de Carvajal (d. 1547): A rogue Spanish soldier, Juan de Carvajal had spent time in Venezuela 
before he was sent as a representative of Licenciate Frias to begin residencia proceedings in the 
province in 1545. Carvajal responded by abusing his power. He acted like a de facto governor in the 
absence of Philipp von Hutten, moving the population of the province away from Coro to the 
interior, where he founded the settlement of Tocuyo in 1546. In an attempt to remain in power, 
Carvajal had Von Hutten and his deputy murdered and continued with his illegitimate command. 
However, a year later, Carvajal was found guilty of the murders by Licenciate Tolosa and was 
executed.  
Ambrose Alfinger (ca. 1500-1533): Sometimes referred to as Dalfinger by the Spanish chroniclers, 
Ambrose Alfinger was the first governor of the Welser colony in Venezuela from 1529 until his death 
in 1533. Born near Ulm, Alfinger worked as a factor for the Welser Company in Spain until his 
Venezuelan appointment. During his governorship, Alfinger led two entradas into the interior of the 
province. The first, between 1529 and 1530, led to the foundation of the town of Maracaibo. His 
second mission began in late 1531 and resulted in his death in the Chinacota Mountains in 1533. His 
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governorship was characterised by the plunder of neighbouring native settlements, without 
attaining any meaningful wealth. His brutal treatment of the natives earned him the epithet of “the 
cruel of the cruels” in Spanish colonial history.  
 
Heinrich Ehinger & Hieronymus Sailer: two factors of the Welser Company in Seville, Ehinger and 
Sailer signed the original capitulation for Venezuela granted by Charles V in 1528 on the Welser’s 
behalf. During Ambrose Alfinger’s absence on his first entrada, Ehinger and Sailer attempted to send 
the former’s brother, Georg, to take over the governorship of the province. This led to conflict with 
the Welser Company, who had appointed Alfinger, and the transference of the capitulation into their 
hands.  
Nikolaus Federmann (ca. 1506-1542): Like Ambrose Alfinger, Nikolaus Federmann had worked for 
the Welser Company in Europe before heading to Venezuela in 1530. Appointed Deputy Governor to 
Alfinger, Federmann conducted his own entrada between 1530 and 1531, which failed to prove the 
existence of a “South Sea” or provide substantial booty. Sent back to Europe by Alfinger for carrying 
out this unauthorised mission, Federmann was initially appointed as the former’s replacement as 
governor in 1534. However, this appointment was quickly revoked because of concerns amongst the 
Spanish settlers that Federmann would continue Alfinger’s brutal regime. He returned to the 
province as Lieutenant-General and carried out his second entrada from 1536 until his arrival in 
Cundinamarca at the end of 1538. Federmann disputed the territorial jurisdiction of the rich 
province with Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada and Sebastian de Benalcazar, returning to Spain in 1539 
to press his claims before the Council of the Indies. However, he was arrested in Flanders in 1540 on 
the orders of the Welser Company for dereliction of duty and embezzlement of funds. Legal 
proceedings would continue against Federmann until his death in Madrid in 1542.   
Georg Hohermuth von Speyer (ca. 1500-1540): Born in Speyer in the Rhineland, Georg Hohermuth 
was initially to be sent to Venezuela in 1534 as a Welser factor in Coro. However, after the 
revocation of Nickolaus Federmann’s nomination for the governorship of the province, Hohermuth 
was named Alfinger’s successor. Soon after his arrival in the Welser colony, Hohermuth led 490 men 
on an exploration mission in May 1535, seeking the riches of the famed “Meta”. The entrada was 
long, depleting and fruitless, and Hohermuth only returned to Coro in May 1538, exhausted after 
three years in the interior. Nevertheless, the governor soon travelled to Santo Domingo to try and 
acquire supplies and recruits for a new entrada. Despite his endeavours, Hohermuth would never 
lead another mission, as he died in 1540 after a short illness.  
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Philipp von Hutten (1505-1546): Philipp von Hutten came from a prominent merchant family and 
worked in the employ of the Welser from a young age. He spent time at Charles V’s court, possibly 
as a Welser factor, and joined Hohermuth on his crossing to the New World in 1534. He 
accompanied the Hohermuth mission, providing a detailed account of the hardships suffered by the 
Europeans and their relations with the native populations. After Hohermuth’s death in 1540, Von 
Hutten was appointed Captain-General of the province by Bishop Bastidas. It is probable that Von 
Hutten was to become the next Welser governor after returning from his search for “El Dorado”, 
which commenced in 1541. His entrada was as unsuccessful as all the previous ones conducted by 
the Welser governors. After nearly five years in the interior, Von Hutten and his men returned to 
Tocuyo, where they had been informed Juan de Carvajal was present. After refusing to abdicate 
power in favour of Carvajal, Von Hutten and his deputy, Bartholomaus Welser VI, were murdered. 
He was the last high-ranking German official in the Welser colony.  
Esteban Martin (d. 1537): The most effective explorer in the Welser colony, Esteban Martin was 
crucial to the survival of the Welser entradas of Alfinger and Hohermuth. His aptitude for 
understanding the natives, excellent guiding of the expeditions, and fearsome combat ability made 
him indispensable in the search for riches. However, he died in 1537 during an attack by the Chogue 
nation.  
Bartolome de Santillana (d. 1534): appointed Deputy in Coro for Governor Alfinger during the 
latter’s second entrada, Bartolome de Santillana ruled in a dictatorial manner which brought civil 
strife to the colony. His brutal regime and staunch support of Governor Alfinger over the majority of 
the settlers alienated many Spaniards from Welser rule and led to Santillana’s own arrest in 1534. 
He supposedly died during the journey to Santo Domingo, where he was to face trial for a long list of 
crimes.  
Hans Seissenhofer (d. 1532): known as Juan de Aleman by the Spanish chroniclers, Hans 
Seissenhofer arrived in Coro in 1530 with the intention of assuming the governorship from the 
absent Ambrose Alfinger. Alfinger’s return foiled Seissenhofer’s plan and he remained in the 
province as a deputy until his death in 1532. 
Licenciate Juan Perez de Tolosa (d. 1549): Sent to conduct a residencia of the province in 1546, 
Licenciate Tolosa ordered the trial and execution of Juan de Carvajal in 1547 for the murder of 
Philipp von Hutten. As the Welser failed to provide a new governor for the province, Tolosa 
effectively took this role. He oversaw the return of the capital to Coro, the construction of new 
coastal settlements and trade routes with the neighbouring Spanish provinces. He died in 1549 and 
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was succeeded by a series of temporary governors until the province was removed from Welser 
control in 1556. 
Bartholomew (V) (1484-1561) and Anton Welser (1486-1557): the heads of the Welser Company 
throughout the lifespan of the Venezuela colony, Bartholomew and Anton Welser never travelled to 
the New World. They originally permitted Heinrich Ehinger and Hieronymus Sailer, two of their 
factors, to sign the Venezuela contract in their name. However, after Georg Ehinger (Heinrich’s 
brother) attempted to usurp power from Ambrose Alfinger in 1530, the contract was renegotiated in 
the Welser name. During this period in Europe, Bartholomew and Anton Welser were two of the 
most successful merchants and had stakes in numerous ventures, allowing them to finance Charles 
V’s treasury. 
Bartholomew (VI) Welser: the son of Bartholomew V, Bartholomew (VI) Welser was sent to 
Venezuela in 1540 seemingly to impose some order on the colony and relate back to his father. 
However, he ultimately took part in the failed Von Hutten venture, which ended in his own murder 
at the hands of Carvajal in 1546 at Tocuyo.  
 
French Colony 
Paul d’Ausillon de Sauveterre: a French nobleman who accompanied the Cartier expedition in 1541, 
Paul d’Ausillon returned to France soon after his arrival in Canada, taking with him the “gold” and 
“diamonds” the French thought they had found. It is possible he was sent to relieve the Roberval 
colony in 1543 with fresh supplies and recruits. However, there is no evidence he ever arrived at his 
destination. 
 
Jacques Cartier (1491-1557): was an experienced navigator from the fishing town of St. Malo. 
Although little is known definitively of his life before 1534 it is likely he had experience sailing the 
waters off Newfoundland, as many French fishermen of his time did. Furthermore, the references he 
makes to Brazil in the narratives of his voyages suggest he may have been involved in the merchant 
trade there. He was certainly skilled enough to win the support of Grand Admiral Phillipe Chabot, 
who chose Cartier for the first Canadian voyage in 1534. He conducted a second voyage in 1535, 
wintering near the native settlement of Stadacona before returning to France in 1536. After being 
given a commission for a third Canadian venture in 1540, Cartier was subsequently replaced as 
commander by the Sieur de Roberval, who was to lead a colonising mission. Retained as Master-
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Pilot, Cartier led the first half of the colonists in 1541, returning the following year before Roberval’s 
arrival. Little is known about Cartier after this point, except that he died at St. Malo in 1557. 
 
Donnacona: the Lord of Stadacona, the place of French settlement in Canada, Donnacona was the 
chief of the Iroquoians inhabiting the region until he was captured by Cartier in 1536. He played an 
important role at the French court, convincing Francois I of the existence of the Kingdom of 
Saguenay. He died before he could return to his native land. 
 
Domagaya and Taignoagny: sons of Donnacona, Lord of Stadacona, Domagaya and Taignoagny were 
seized on Jacques Cartier’s orders during his first voyage in 1534. They were initially responsible for 
informing Cartier of the mythical land of Saguenay, which ensured their return to their homeland in 
1535. Domagaya also provided the cure for the scurvy that broke out amongst the French in 1536. 
They were captured for a second time at the end of Cartier’s second voyage, ultimately dying in 
France along with their father. 
 
Jean-Francois de la Rocque de Roberval (c. 1500-1560): The Sieur de Roberval was a Protestant 
nobleman in the Catholic court of Francois I. He was purportedly a childhood friend of Francois, 
which negated the problems caused by his religious differences. He took part in the Italian Wars and 
conducted privateering ventures against Spanish fleets. He was renowned at court for his 
flamboyant and expensive lifestyle, which had led him towards bankruptcy by the time he received 
the commission to lead a colonial mission to Canada in 1541. Because he could not acquire the 
provisions he needed in time, Roberval sent Jacques Cartier to establish a settlement along the St. 
Lawrence and wait for his arrival. Roberval finally left La Rochelle in 1542, meeting the returning 
Cartier on the way. Despite failing to convince Cartier to return to Canada with him, Roberval 
continued with his men. He returned to France in 1543, where he began a career of piracy to negate 
his financial troubles. He was killed by a Catholic mob in 1560. 
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Appendix 3 – Colony Timelines 
Welser Colony Year French Colony 
March - Charles V awards administration of 
Venezuela to Welser Company 
1528  
February - Governor Ambrose Alfinger and 300 
colonists arrive in Coro  
1529  
September - Foundation of Maracaibo    
January - Georg Ehinger attempts to take control of 
province in absence of Ambrose 
1530  
April - Hans Seissenhofer also fails to take control as 
Ambrose returns from his 1
st
 entrada 
  
September - Nikolaus Federmann and 114 men head 
south on his first entrada  
  
March - Federmann returns to Coro  1531  
September - Ambrose Alfinger begins 2
nd
 entrada    
May - Governor Alfinger killed by natives at 
Chinacota 
1533  
November - Remnants of Alfinger mission returns 
under Pedro de San Martin 
  
May - Rodrigo de Bastidas appointed Interim 
Governor by Audiencia of Santo Domingo 
1534 April – Jacques Cartier embarks on his first voyage to 
Canada with 61 men 
  September – Cartier’s first expedition returns to France 
February - Georg Hohermuth von Speyer arrives as 
new Welser governor  
1535 May – Cartier embarks on his second voyage with 110 
men 
May - Hohermuth leaves on entrada with 490 men  September – Stadacona reached for the first time 
  October – Cartier reaches Hochelaga 
Maracaibo settlement evacuated by Federmann 1536 May – Cartier captures Donnacona and departs Canada 
March - Federmann commences his 2
nd
 entrada to 
the West of Coro 
 July – Cartier’s second expedition returns to France 
Bishop Bastidas returns as Interim Governor in 
Hohermuth’s absence 
1538  
May - Hohermuth returns to Coro with depleted 
forces 
  
July - The Residencia of Dr. Navarro commences    
November - Federmann reaches Cundinamarca and 
meets Quesada and Benalcazar 
  
July - Federmann and Quesada return to Spain to 
press claims for Cundinamarca 
1539  
Federmann arrested on Welser orders for breach of 
contract and embezzlement  
1540 October – Cartier commissioned for a third voyage 
Cundinamarca is awarded to Quesada’s Santa Marta   
June - Governor Hohermuth dies   
November – Bishop Bastidas appointed Interim 
Governor a third time 
  
August - Governor-Elect Philipp von Hutten leaves 
Coro on entrada 
1541 January – Cartier’s commission is revoked in favour of a 
colonisation mission under the Sieur de Roberval 
  May – Cartier leaves France with 5 ships – Roberval 
remains 
  August – French arrive near Stadacona and begin 
constructing the Charlesbourg-Royale settlement at Cap-
Rouge 
  September – Cartier heads towards Hochelaga in search 
of Saguenay 
February - Federmann dies in Valladolid 1542 April – Roberval leaves La Rochelle with 3 ships 
  June – At Newfoundland Roberval encounters the 
returning Cartier, who has abandoned Charlesbourg-
Royale 
  July – Roberval’s expedition commence the fortification 
of France-Roy settlement; also at Cap-Rouge 
October - Licenciate Frias commissioned to conduct 
new Residencia of Welser Colony 
1543 June – Roberval attempts to find passage to Saguenay 
and fails 
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  September – Roberval returns to France having 
abandoned settlement 
January - Juan de Carvajal arrives in Venezuela as 
representative of Frias – he moves the capital inland 
to Tocuyo 
1545  
May – Returning from their entrada, Philipp von 
Hutten and his Deputy, Bartholomaus Welser, are 
executed by Carvajal 
1546  
June – Licenciate Tolosa arrives in province and 
becomes de facto governor  
  
Welser face legal proceedings at Council of Indies in 
Madrid to determine fate of colony 
1550s  
April - The Welser’s Venezuelan contract is revoked 1556  
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Appendix 4 - Glossary 
Audiencia – Royal courts established throughout the Spanish Empire. The Audiencia of Santo 
Domingo, on the island of Hispaniola, was established in 1511 and remained the dominant New 
World court throughout the Welser period. 
Cedula – royal decree 
Council of the Indies – the highest administrative body relating to the Spanish New World, located in 
Madrid. It combined legislative, judicial and executive powers. Cedulas from the Council were final.  
Ducats – second most valuable unit of common currency in Spain in the sixteenth century  
Encomienda – “The privilege granted to a conquistador to collect tribute from the Indians who were 
entrusted to him, for his lifetime and that of his first heir; in exchange for this he promised under 
oath to be responsible for the spiritual and temporal welfare of his encomendados and the defence 
of the district where they lived”.1 
Entrada – mission of exploration and conquest conducted by Conquistadores 
Hispaniola – The island today made up of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, Hispaniola was the first 
territory settled by the Spaniards in New World. 
Livres – common currency of France up to 1795 
Pesos – most valuable unit of common currency in Spain in the sixteenth century 
Residencia – colonial assessments, carried out on the behest of the Council of the Indies in Madrid. 
They were often initiated in response to complaints by royal officials in particular colonies. An 
individual lawyer would be sent to conduct the residencia and report his findings back to Madrid. 
Royal Fifth (Quinto Real) – A royal tax, usually applied to precious metals, but also to other 
commodities, whereby the Spanish Crown took 20% of all goods attained in their colonies.  
Santo Domingo – The capital of Hispaniola and of the Spanish New World in general in the early 
period after discovery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Luis Weckmann, The Medieval Heritage of Mexico (Volume 1) (New York, 1992) p. 353  
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